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INTRODUCTION
The arena of human rights discourse and practice has been dominated by
attention to the more commonly known civil and political rights-rights to
free expression, political and civic association, and freedom from torture,
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. By contrast, economic, social and
cultural rights are much less well known, and only rarely do they form the
subject of concerted political action, media campaigns or critical reportage.
This is the case in the countries of both the "North" and "South." This
dearth of action is a more acute problem in the latter because of the
widespread lack of basic human needs such as clean and potable water,
sufficient food, adequate shelter and comprehensive health care. In sum,
economic, social and cultural human rights are the poor relation of their civil
and political counterparts. Yet, both in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights' and in subsequent international documents,2 the two categories of
t This study represents the first phase of an attempt to come to grips with the operation-
alization of economic and social rights in Africa in an activist fashion. It examines broad
questions relating to the international, regional and national aspects of the phenomenon. The
second part grapples with the intricacies of the domestic arena. I am grateful to the Ford
Foundation for its support of the project and in particular to Margo Picken for her commitment
to the idea. Philip Alston, Yash Ghai, Tomas Hammarberg, Mahmood Mamdani and Danilo
TUrk gave of their time to provide a more concise focus to the project. Sylvia Tamale played
Devil's Advocate and Chief Critic, while the students in my Human Rights Seminar provided a
stimulating context in which to debate many of these issues. Larry Cox, Rolf Knieper, George
Okoth-Obbo, Sigrun Skogly, David Weissbrodt and Claude Welch made substantive comments
on an earlier draft of the paper. I am deeply grateful to Cheri Attix of the California Western
International Law Journal for her excellent editorial work and probing questions which forced
me to reexamine many issues I have hitherto taken for granted.
* LL.B (Hons) (MUK); LL.M. S.J.D. (Harv.), Dip.L.P. (LDC). Senior Lecturer, Faculty
of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda, and Visiting Professor, University of Minnesota
Law School/Institute of International Studies (1994-1995).
1. Adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res 217A (III), U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948), reprinted
in 43 AM. J. INT'L. L. 127 (Supp. 1949) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
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rights are placed on an equal footing, with an emphasis on their indivisibility,
interconnection and interrelationship. 3 As we approach the next millennium,
with social and economic conditions of existence exacerbating civil and
political strife, it is time to devote more attention to those human rights which
have been neglected and to devise appropriate methods to boost their
recognition and enforcement. A first step in this direction is simply to
examine the existing situation with respect to the observation of economic,
social and cultural rights in individual countries and regions of the world.
This essay offers a preliminary analysis of economic and social human rights
in specific relation to the African continent.
A. The African Status Quo
Zairean president Mobutu Sese Sekou wa Zabanga is the dinosaur of
African politics, having effectively reigned over his country even before the
1961 assassination of Patrice Lumumba.4 Following in the footsteps of the
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCRI; Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, G.A. Res. S-3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp.
No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Agenda Item 48, U.N. Doc. A/Res./3281
(1975), reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: BASIC
DOCUMENTS AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 347-55 (M. Hamalengwa et al. eds., 1987); and
The Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 41st
Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 101, U.N. Doc. A/41/925 (1986).
3. Recent thought and action on human rights and development has brought the somewhat
parallel movement between the two categories of rights closer together. The culmination could
be said to be the Vienna Conference, the declaration of which stated, "All human rights are
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated...." Vienna Declaration and Program
of Action, U.N. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, art. 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/24 (Part 1) (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M 1661, 1665 (1993) (emphasis added).
See also HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: YEARBOOK 1994, 2 (Peter Baehr et al.,
eds. 1994).
4. Although Mobutu became President of what was then the Congo Republic following a
military coup d'etat in November 1965, his de facto leadership of the country commenced in
September, 1960. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ZAIRE: REPRESSION AS
POLICY 16-17 (1990). Patrice Lumumba was the first elected Prime Minister of the Belgian
Congo, upon its attainment of independence from its former Belgian rulers in 1960. Lumumba's
socialist and Pan-Africanist ideology immediately brought him into confrontation with the
Western powers, prominent among which was the United States, which perceived him to be a
communist. The CIA covertly organized his removal. Lumumba set the tone of his government
on the day his country gained independence, with a fiery speech that not only embarrassed the
departing colonial power, but also sent a signal of radicalism around the world:
Such was our lot for eighty years under colonial rdgime; our wounds are still
too fresh and painful for us to be able to forget them at will, for we have experienced
painful labour demanded of us in return for wages that were not enough to enable us
to eat properly, nor to be decently dressed or sheltered, nor to bring up our children
as we longed to. We have experienced contempt, insults and blows, morning, noon
and night because we were 'blacks.' . . . We have seen our lands despoiled in the
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late Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, he is believed to have amassed a
fortune far in excess of his country's national debt, bankrupting what must
be one of the richest nations on the continent.5 Despite long-standing
demands for his departure, Mobutu refuses to budge, contemptuously
dismissing his opponents as power-hungry opportunists.6  Mobutu's
continued domination of the Zairean political scene has effectively denied his
people their civil and political human rights to free expression, association
and participation.7  At the same time, his corruption and vice directly
impinge upon the people of Zaire's economic and social human rights to
adequate health care, sufficient food and appropriate shelter.s Both catego-
ries of rights are guaranteed in the international human rights instruments.
Yet for much of his career, Mobutu has posed as a spokesperson for
economic and social development and harped upon the need to redress
international imbalances in trade and in relations between North and South.9
Mobutu's Janus-like posturing stands at an extreme, but in both hypocrisy
and duplicity he by no means stands alone. Indeed, an examination of the
history of economic and social rights in Africa elicits several reasons to
review and question the positions adopted by its international leaders with
Quoted in THOMAS KANZA, THE RISE AND FALL OF PATRICE LUMUMBA 161-62 (1977). See also
SEAN KELLY, AMERICA'S TYRANT: THE CIA AND MOBUTU OF ZAIRE (1993).
5. See ZAIRE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (Guy Gran ed., 1979).
Zaire is naturally well endowed with a host of mineral riches, including extensive reserves of
gold, diamond, copper, cobalt and zinc. Id. As Lawrence Ekpebu recounts, the southern province
of Katanga has been particularly important to Zaire's economy, having once accounted for
"eighty percent of the world's industrial diamonds, seventy-three percent of the world's cobalt,
eight percent of its copper, and sixty percent of the uranium used by Western countries. In
addition Katanga produces large quantities of bismium, cadmium, columbium, germanium, gold,
manganese, silver, tantalum, tin, tungsten and zinc." See LAWRENCE B. EKPEBU, ZAIRE AND THE
AFRICAN REVOLUTION 21 (1989). See also CRAWFORD YOUNG & THOMAS TURNER, THE RISE
AND DECLINE OF THE ZAIRIAN STATE 34-35 (1985), and WINSOME J. LESLIE, ZAIRE:
CONTINUITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN AN OPPRESSIVE STATE 102 (1993).
6. Sam Kiley, Zaire: Apocalypse Now, THE TIMES (London), July 31, 1993, at M Oa. Since
the early 1990s, Mobutu has faced a range of opponents to his regime, the most prominent of
whom is Etienne Tshiekedi wa Mulumba. Responding to popular pressure for political reform,
Mobutu permitted the creation of a National Conference to discuss the constitutional future of
Zaire, but has almost totally ignored their recommendations for change. Mobutu's unpopularity
stems from the long period of time he has been in power, brooking no opposition, detaining his
opponents, and strangling the basic elements of civil society including the Media, trade unions
and political parties. For a more recent update of the Zairean debacle, see Howard W. French,
Mobutu, Zaire's Guide Leads Nation into Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1995, at I.
7. Mobutu has suppressed civil and political rights in his country through the banning of any
political opposition; harassment of the media, and detention without trial and the political
assassination of opponents. French, supra note 6, at 1. For an account of Mobutu's human
rights record, see LESLIE, supra note 5, at 31-49.
8. LESLIE, supra note 5, at 80-85. For an account of Mobutu's personal wealth, see YOUNG
& TURNER, supra note 5, at 78-183.
9. Such concern with development does not always translate into concern with economic and
social rights as such. On Mobutu's posing as a statesman for the deprived peoples of Africa, see
LESLIE, supra note 5, at 162-64; EKPEBU, supra note 5.
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respect to the instruments and mechanisms established in international fora.
Such a review must necessarily sever their words from their deeds.
There are several reasons for such an approach. First, despite the
eventual focus on the individual as the subject of development, as well as of
economic and social rights, considerable contention accompanied the process
of arriving at such a position.'" Much of the initial debate about develop-
ment focused on the place of the state. Some condemned and demanded
atonement for the very real debilitations imposed by imperialism," others
contended that attention to the civil and political rights of individuals must
be sacrificed in the interests of achieving the social and economic advance-
ment of the State.'2 The latter demand-referred to by Rhoda Howard as
the "full-belly thesis""-was translated as the state's right to receive more
international aid, for a time considered the panacea to all Africa's develop-
mental problems.' 4
Further removing individuals from the focus, was the Cold War stalemate
which caused both western and eastern mentors to turn a blind eye to the
human rights violations of their client states in the pursuit of strategic military
and economic interests. 5 Needless to say, both categories of human
rights--economic, social and cultural and civil and political-suffered as a
consequence.' 6
10. But see ISSA G. SHIvJI, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA (1989). Shivji
asserts that no human rights instrument has in fact raised individuals to the status where they,
and not states, are the primary focus of attention. Id. at 82-83.
I1. Imperialism first denied the African peoples their rights of self-determination; it
destroyed cultures and civilizations that had been in existence for centuries and imposed alien
legal, political and social structures of organization, the effects of which are still reverberating
in continuing relations of domination and control. Particularly debilitating was the arbitrary and
forcible amalgamation of different and autonomous communities into colonial structures which
had no relation to the history, political economy or culture of the various African societies. For
a contemporary treatment of the issue of imperialism and its impact, see FRANK FOREDI, THE
NEW IDEOLOGY OF IMPERIALISM: RENEWING THE MORAL IMPERATIVE (1994).
12. R.N. Kiwanuka, Developing Rights: The UN Declaration on the Right to Development,
35 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 257-72, 263 (1988).
13. See Rhoda Howard, The Full belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights take Priority over
Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 9 HuM. RTS. Q. 467 (1987).
14. GRAHAM HANCOCK, LORDS OF POVERTY: THE POWER, PRESTIGE AND CORRUPTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL AID BusINEss 187-88 (1989); see also SHIVJI, supra note 10.
15. See FRED MARTE, POLITICAL CYCLES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE COLD WAR
AND AFRICA 1945-1990 (1994). The violations committed extended to rights such as to self-
determination (as with American and British support for various apartheid regimes in South
Africa); free association and assembly (in collusion with single-party regimes that proscribed
opposition, and suppressed expression, e.g. Soviet support for Mengistu Haile Mariam in
Ethiopia; French support for Eyadema in Togo, and initial British and Israeli support for Idi
Amin in Uganda, as well as U.S. support for Samuel Doe in Liberia). The Cold War stalemate
also contributed to the non-realization of a variety of economic, social and cultural rights (food,
adequate living standards, health, etc.).
16. The most affected were those in which outright war (both civil and international) broke
out. This was the case in Angola and Mozambique, and in a variety of the conflicts in the Horn.
MARTE, supra note 15, at 197-386.
[Vol. 26
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Contemporary African scholarship too, tended to be constricted by the
respective ideological blinkers of east and west, and in some ways followed
the rhetorical position of the leadership. Thus, African scholars made the
claim that the protection of civil and political rights should await the
implementation of economic and social rights, in one and the same breath as
the assertion that African states were too poor to realize the latter. 7
Paradoxically, however, while the literature on civil and political rights in
Africa between the 1960s and the 1980s is fairly extensive and intellectually
probing, 8 that which examines economic and social rights is rather
scanty.' 9 By contrast, the amount of literature on the topic emanating from
other regions of the world is fair, albeit not substantial.2" Finally, although
the growth of indigenous African human rights groups whose main focus is
17. Minasse Haile, Human Rights in Africa: Observations on the Implications of Economic
Priority, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 300-01 (1986). See also Osita C. Eze, Right to
Health as a Human Right in Africa, in LE DROIT A LA SANTE EN TANT QUE DROIT DE L'HOMME
[THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT] 76, 84-85 (Rend-Jean Dupuy, ed., 1979).
18. See Hamalengwa, supra note 2, at 390-403. See also Akinola Aguda & Oluwadare
Aguda, Judicial Protection of Some Fundamental Rights in Nigeria and in the Sudan Before and
During Military Rule, 16 J. AFR. L. 130 (1972); Yash Ghai, Law, Development and African
Scholarship, 50(6) MOD. L. REV. 750 (1987); Steven B. Pfeiffer, The Role of the Judiciary in
the Constitutional Systems of East Africa, 16 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 33 (1978); Ebow Bondzie-
Simpson, A Critique of the African Charter on Human & Peoples Rights, 31(4) How. L.J. 643
(1988).
19. While the literature on economic and social issues (such as poverty, development and
structural adjustment, for example) is extensive, few scholars have adopted a rights-based focus
to their analyses. In a 1986 bibliography on human rights in Africa, for example, less than
twenty out of a total of 168 citations focused on the issue of economic and social rights at the
domestic level. See J. Cobbah & M. Hamalengwa, The Human Rights Literature on Africa: A
Bibliography, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 115-125 (1986). For those which did focus on economic and
social rights, only a handful were seriously concerned with the local context in any critical
fashion. Cf S.B.O. Gutto, Violation of Human Rights in the Third World: Responsibility of
States and Transnational Corporations, in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 275-92 (Frederick E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai, eds. 1987). See
also Rhoda E. Howard, Law and Development in Commonwealth Africa, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
607 (1985).
20. See JACK TOBIN, GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH 130-47 (1994). See also id. at
148-184 for related rights. On general studies, see Philip Alston, The United Nations Specialized
Agencies and Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79 (1979); Asbjorn Eide, Realization of Social and
Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold Approach, 10 HUM. RTS. L. J. 35 (1989); Shelly
Wright, Economic Rights and Social Justice: A Feminist Analysis of Some International Human
Rights Conventions, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 241 (1992); and CLARENCE DIAS & DAVID
GILLIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT (1993). The more active regions on
economic, social and cultural rights are Asia and Latin America. On Asia, see inter alia, ACCESS
TO JUSTICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA (Harry M. Scoble &
Laurie S. Wiseberg, eds., 1985), HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISM IN ASIA: SOME PERSPECTIVES,
PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES (Asian Coalition of Human Rights Organizations-ACHRO/Council
on International and Public Affairs eds., 1984); and Mary Caballero-Anthony, Human Rights,
Economic Change and Political Development: A Southeast Asian Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC 39-53 (James T.H. Tang, ed. 1995); and
Yash Ghai, Asian Perspectives on Human Rights, in Tang, id. at 54-67. On Latin America, see
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS (Hernfn L. Fuenzalida-Puelma, & Susan Scholle
Connor, eds., 1989).
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civil and political rights has been phenomenal over the past several years,2
the relative dearth of those covering economic and social rights in an activist
fashion is, to say the least, disturbing.22 Despite all the talk over the last
thirty years about sacrificing votes for food, economic and social rights
remain the poor relation of civil and political rights in Africa-a situation
long in need of remedy.23
The end of the cold war compels us to consider how to further the
connection between development and human rights in general, and between
development and economic and social rights in particular.24  For Africa, it
is especially critical to reconsider the issue in a holistic manner,25 because
current democracy struggles are strongly underpinned by what Julius
Nyang'oro refers to as a demand for "the betterment of economic life."
26
This factor is all too often overlooked in the euphoria of political transi-
tion."
B. The Elements of a Holistic Approach
Clearly the situation now demands a more nuanced and critical reconsid-
eration of both national policy and international practice that simultaneously
transcends the rhetorical smokescreen erected by African leaders, and directly
21. Some of the organizations that have emerged in the last decade include: the Nigerian
Civil Liberties Organization (CLO); the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC); Women in
Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF); Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) in
Uganda; Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l'Homme (RADDHO)-African
Meeting for the Defense of Human Rights in Senegal, and the Interafricaine des Droits de
I'Homme (UIDH)-InterAfrican Union of Human Rights in Burkina Faso. That growth stands
in marked contrast to the predictions of only a decade ago, which were doubtful that a vibrant
indigenous human rights movement was possible in Africa. See Harry M. Scoble, Human Rights
Non-Governmental Organizations in Black Africa: Their Problems and Prospects in the Wake
of the Banjul Charter, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 177, 188-89 (Claude
E. Welch Jr. & Ronald I. Meltzer eds., 1984).
22. A recent survey of human rights organizations in Africa notes that with the exception
of South Africa, which has a unique history, action on economic and social rights in the rest of
the continent is rare. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNSHIP PROGRAMISWEDISH NGO
FOUNDATION, THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA 5-6 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter STATUS REPORT]. Although the report surveyed only 26 countries, they were representative
of the different regional, linguistic and political variations that exist in Africa today.
23. Paul Hunt makes this point succinctly: "Although the norms, procedures and institutions
relating to civil and political rights remain incomplete and flawed, they are more fully developed
than those involving economic, social and cultural rights. One component of 'a unified approach'
should be to redress this juridical imbalance between the two categories of rights." Paul Hunt,
Reclaiming Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, I WAIKATO L. REv. 141, 146 (1993).
24. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Revitalising United Nations Work on Human Rights and
Development, 18 MELB. L. REv. 216, 216-17 (1991).
25. Cf Allan McChesney, The Promotion of Economic and Political Rights: Two African
Approaches, 24 J. AFR. L. 163 (1980).
26. Julius E. Nyang'oro, Reform Politics and the Democratization Process in Africa, 37
AFR. STUD. REv. 133, 146 (1994).
27. See Kathryn Nwajiaku, The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited, 32 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 429, 433-34 (1994).
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challenges the traditional ambivalence of the international community.2"
Such an approach also means a confrontation with some of the traditional
arguments against the enforceability and justiciability of this category of
rights,29 particularly in light of the globalization of the capitalist system.3
Attending the process of globalization is the increasing omnipotence of
international financial and development institutions (IFDIs).3" Coupled with
this is the development of regional initiatives, covering, inter alia, the human
28. Such ambivalence is reflected in a variety of ways, not least of which is the failure to
give due cognizance to economic and social rights as human rights. See Philip Alston, U.S.
Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely
New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365 (1990).
29. Despite the considerable progress on this front, particularly that made by the Committee
of Experts charged with the implementation of the ICESCR, the question of justiciability of this
category of rights is evidently still a live issue. This was most recently demonstrated in the
vociferous objections to the inclusion of social and economic rights in the draft South African
constitution. For an account, see Anton J. Steenkamp, The South African Constitution of 1993
and the Bill of Rights: An Evaluation in Light of International Human Rights Norms, in 17 HUM.
RTs. Q. 101, 113-15 (1995).
30. See Arthur MacEwan, Globalization and Stagnation, 45 MONTHLY REV. 1 (1994). The
growth and spread of global capitalism is a particular problem for the realization of economic
and social rights because it places an emphasis on unrestricted market forces with scant attention
to the need for protections and guarantees against deterioration in standards of living, health-care,
labour (employment and conditions of employment, such as minimum wages, health and safety
etc.) or social security. Globalization also smothers local initiative and enterprise, and creates
economic conglomerations that snuff out any competition. Free trade regimes bolster those who
are already powerful and advantaged in technological and capital foundations. For a concise and
succinct treatment of globalization, see UPENDRA BAXI, INHUMAN WRONGS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
UNCONVENTIONAL ESSAYS 37-45 (1994).
3 1. I use the term IFDI in preference to the more usual International Financial Institutions
(IFI), because both organizations state their concerns to be with development. For an
examination of the rise to prominence and current operations of the IFDIs, see 1 THE IMF, THE
WORLD BANK AND THE AFRICAN DEBT (Bade Onimode ed., 1989). The omnipotence of IFDIs
is reflected in the "Paris Club" meetings at which developing country debts are rescheduled.
This rescheduling takes place upon the performance of a host of conditions, such as currency
devaluation, export-production, and trade liberalization. Sometimes, those conditions extend to
political questions, including multiparty politics and the liberalization of control over the media.
IMF/IBRD advisors in Central Banks wield enormous authority, particularly in countries which
rely on multilateral funding to meet both their recurrent and development budgets. When
countries resist reform, they are coerced or isolated into capitulation. This suggests, according
to Swatuk,
the growing global hegemony of the language of neo-classical economics. Creditors
may be willing to bargain, and Third World policy-makers may be able to exploit the
fears of the banking community, but ultimately all parties are accepting of the rules,
norms and procedures inherent in the global financial regime. Where they do not
accept these rules, norms and procedures, pressure is brought to bear until they can
no longer resist and must capitulate.
Larry A. Swatuk, Review Essay: Dead-End to Development? Post-Cold War Africa in the New
International Division of Labor, 38 AFR. STUD. REV. 103, 112 (1995). On the composition,
structure and operation of the Paris Club, see MICHAEL G. KUHN ET AL., OFFICIAL FINANCING
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 22-34 (1994).
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rights arena,32 the area of migration"3 and refugees, as well as a renewed
focus on conflict resolution and peace building.34 All these factors necessi-
tate the consideration of economic and social rights as a critical component
of the agenda for the next millennium." Most importantly, the implications
32. Regional initiatives in the human rights arena include: The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR); the African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights; the European
Union Mechanisms (Court and Commission), and the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe (CSCE).
The CSCE emerges from a series of conferences held between European countries of the
former Eastern and Western blocs. The main elements of the process were enshrined in the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on August 1,
1975, reprinted in FROM HELSINKI TO VIENNA: BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS
43-100 (Arie Bloed ed., 1990). The human rights dimensions to the process assumed greater
significance at a January 1989 meeting in Vienna where elaborate standards for the observance
of human rights were established. See U.S. State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, The
CSCE Vienna Follow-Up Meeting: A Framework for Europe's Future, Selected Documents, No.
35 (Jan. 1989); Sandra L. Gubin, Between Regimes and Realism-Transnational Agenda Setting:
Soviet Compliance with CSCE Human Rights Norms, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 278, 281-84 (1995).
Since the turbulent events of the 1990s, discussions have focused on the institutionalization of
what was a largely non-formal process. For a recent discussion of the process, see THE CSCE
AND THE TURBULENT NEW EUROPE: RECORD OF A CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW INSTITUTE OF THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, D.C. (Louis B. Sohn ed., 1993). See also Merja Pentikanen & Martin Scheinin,
A Comparative Study of the Monitoring Mechanisms and the Important Instrumental Frameworks
for Human Rights Protection Within the Council of Europe: Comparing International
Procedures and Mechanisms 93, 95-96 (Arie Bloed et al., eds. 1993).
On December 6, 1994, the CSCE became the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) following a Summit meeting in Budapest, Hungary, and a declaration "to give
a new political impetus in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century." The Budapest
Summit Declaration: Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era, Dec. 6, 1994, 15 HUM.
RTs. L.J. 449 (1994). The new name became effective on January 1, 1995. Id.
For a good analysis of the Inter-American system, see Cecilia Medina, Toward a More
Effective Guarantee of the Enjoyment of Human Rights by Women in the Inter-American System,
in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 257 (Rebecca J.
Cook ed., 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN]. Whereas the European system
originally comprised a Commission and a Court, a single court is to replace both, by virtue of
the recently-promulgated Protocol 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights. See
Andrew Drezemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewign, Principal Characteristics of the New European
Convention on Human Rights Control Mechanism, as Established by Protocol No. 11, Signed on
May 11, 1994, in 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 81-86 (1994). The new text of the EUROPEAN CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND ITS PROTOCOLS
is reproduced in 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 102-08 (1994). The original Convention was adopted at
Rome on November 4, 1950, and came into force on September 3, 1953. See Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5,
213 U.N.T.S. 221. The African Commission on Human and People's Rights is established under
Article 45 of the Banjul Charter. See infra note 39.
33. The issue of migration concerns the evolution of restrictive policies, particularly among
the industrialized countries of the North (particularly Europe and North America). See, e.g.,
Kerry E. McCarron, Note, The Schengen Convention as a Violation of International Law and the
Need for Centralized Adjudication on the Validity of National and Multilateral Asylum Policies
for Members of the United Nations, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 401 (1995).
34. See E.K. Quashigah, Protection of Human Rights in the Changing International Scene:
Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 93 (1994).
35. See THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD: THE
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 31-35 (1995); Muna Ndulo, Harmoniza-
tion of Trade Laws in the African Economic Community, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 101, 103-06
(1993). The transition in political conditions in the present era is related to the termination of
the Cold War, and the evolution of new tensions and problems such as internal democratic
[Vol. 26
8
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1 [1995], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol26/iss1/3
1995] THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN AFRICA 9
for the most marginalized and oppressed members of society-women,
children and minorities-must be carefully examined, and integrated into
projected solutions. 6  As the "second winds of change" gust across the
continent from the Cape to the Horn, it is appropriate to initiate a serious
inquiry that remedies the lip-service attention given to economic and social
rights: How do we get beyond the rhetoric?
Presented in this essay is a preliminary framework in which some debate
on the preceding issues can be joined. Part I of this Article surveys the
international arena and considers the African response to the institutional
mechanisms established to promote the realization of both economic and
social, and civil and political rights. Within this same frame of analysis, it
examines the operation of a variety of significant economic and political
actors, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN), and international
NGOs."
Part II of the Article examines the African context. It commences with
an historical overview of the general human rights situation in Africa with an
emphasis on the role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 8 It then
governance; local popular community participation and grassroots initiatives, as well as the
increasing prominence of women and other marginalized groups. In social terms, the transition
is directly linked to the shrinkage of the state and of its involvement both in providing social
services (health, education, water, etc.) and in being the dominant employer. Liberalization has
meant that foreign capital has also gained significantly greater power with fewer restrictions to
its operations. The need for a collective response is dictated by the growing enormity and
complexity of the issues involved, the movement towards regional blocs (as in Europe), and the
near impossibility of autarky.
36. It should be noted that separate institutional mechanisms have been established to
consider the issue of economic and social rights for this category of persons, especially the
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and
the Committee on the Rights of the Child, with the latter having a proposed African counterpart.
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 32, reprinted in I AFR. Y.B. INT'L
L. 295 (1993) [hereinafter African Children's Charter]. For a description of the manner of
selection, composition and term of office of the Committee, see African Children's Charter, part
II. For more extensive examinations of the situation of women, see Claude E. Welch, Jr., Human
Rights and African Women: A Comparison of Two Major Treaties, 15 HuM. RTs. Q. 549 (1993).
On children's rights in general, see Thomas Hammarberg, The Rights of the Child in Developing
Countries: International Norms and Procedures for Real Change?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: YEARBOOK 1994, supra note 3, at 9-25; for Africa, see Bankole
Thompson, Africa's Charter on Children's Rights: A Normative Break with Cultural Traditional-
ism, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 432 (1992).
37. The following UN bodies and specialized agencies inter alia, can be regarded as having
some relevance to the area of economic and social rights: The United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP); International Labour Organization (ILO); World Health
Organization (WHO); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP).
38. The OAU is the premier political organization in Africa. It was established in 1963 as
an instrument to pursue the total liberation and unification of the continent. See ZDENEK
tERVENKA, THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND ITS CHARTER 22-45 (1968).
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examines the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Banjul
Charter)39 and the Lagos Plan of Action for development and economic
growth.40 Part III broadly considers the domestic context in which econom-
ic and social rights are intended to find ultimate meaning and expression. It
then offers some tentative suggestions for concrete action to revitalize
economic and social human rights activism in Africa.
I. AFRICAN STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SCENE
A. The International Covenants and the Mechanisms of Enforcement
Since the elevation of human rights to the arena of international concern
in the period following the second world war, a major objective of the United
Nations has been the design of mechanisms to ensure that the ideals of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights could be enforced.4 The first steps
toward this objective were taken with the promulgation of two Cove-
nants-the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)42
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).43 Interestingly, these instruments came into existence nearly
twenty years after the Universal Declaration was adopted, and did not enter
into force until 10 years later, in 1976. 4" That history has been treated in
greater detail elsewhere.45 Suffice it to mention that while the Covenants
have had a noticeable impact on the evolution of international human rights
law, a number of loopholes still remain in their implementation.46
39. OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21 ILM 59 (1982) [hereinafter
Banjul Charter].
40. ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA: 1980-2000 (1981) [hereinafter LPA].
41. See Torkel Opsahl, Instruments of Implementation of Human Rights, 10 HuM. RTS. L.J.
13 (1989).
42. Adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
43. ICESCR, supra note 2.
44. Michael H. Posner, The Evolution of Human Rights Law, 31 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 449 (1994).
45. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 9-11 (Louis Henkin, ed. 1981).
46. Cindy A. Cohn, The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes Related to the Human
Rights Committee and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 13 HuM. RTS. Q. 295 (1991).
The loopholes in the implementation of the Covenants include: the length of time for a remedy
to be realized, in part because of the requirement, in Article 5 of the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, that all available local remedies be exhausted, the nature of the sanction, which is little
more than mild censorship of the offending party, with no enforceable obligations; the problem
of ensuring that a remedy is actually realized, and the absence of an individual petitions
mechanism with respect to the ICESCR. See ICESCR, supra note 2, arts. 16, 17 & 18; ICCPR,
supra note 42, art. 40.
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The implementation of the Covenants is overseen by special Committees,
comprising experts selected on the basis of personal merit." The two
instruments establish a variety of supervisory mechanisms including inter-state
complaints,48 and individual or group petitions.49 Finally, there is the
mechanism of reporting by states parties to the Covenants.5" Complaints
and petitions have been of varying utility in terms of enhancing respect for
the observation and realization of human rights. State reporting has been of
particular importance in the evolution, development and acceptability of the
supervisory mechanisms established in the Covenants. Indeed, as Philip
Alston notes, reporting is the only implementation mechanism that is
specifically provided for in the ICESCR,51 although it is also "only one part
of a continuing process, the domestic rather than the international ramifica-




Under the ICCPR, states parties are required to submit reports "on the
measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein
and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights."53 The obliga-
tion accrues within one year of the entry into force of the Covenant for the
particular State Party concerned, and thereafter, whenever the Human Rights
Committee (HRC) established under Article 28 so requests. The HRC studies
and comments on the reports at bi-annual sessions. Its comments are noted
47. See Part IV of both Covenants, but with respect to the ICESCR, see also, Philip Alston,
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 473, 474-76 (Philip Alston, ed., 1992).
48. ICCPR, supra note 42, art. 41.
49. First Optional Protocol to ICCPR, see infra note 86.
50. ICESCR, supra note 2, arts. 16 & 17; ICCPR, supra note 42, art. 40. There are other
mechanisms established under the United Nations system which are also of relevance to the
realization of economic and social rights. Thus, the Economic and Social Council, the Human
Rights Commission and the sub-Commissions established under the UN Charter have also
devoted some attention to economic and social rights, including the passage of resolutions on the
effects of structural adjustment policies arising from foreign debt on the enjoyment of human
rights. There have also been resolutions on extreme poverty, the ownership of property, the
question of the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, and the right to development.
The most important aspect of the Commission work with respect to the development of the area
has been through the commissioning of studies. The most outstanding of these has been the
series of progressive reports commissioned on the realization of economic, social and cultural
rights, written by Danillo Ttlrk, the last of which was submitted at the 44th session of the
Commission. See The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Final Report by
Special Rapporteur Danillo Tiirk, U.N. ESCOR HUM. RTS. COMM'N, 44th Sess., Prov. Agenda
Item 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1922/16 (1992) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur's Report];
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Fiftieth Session [Jan. 31-Mar. 11, 1994], U.N.
ESCOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132 (1994); and Karen Reierson &
David Weissbrodt, The Forty-third Session of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation and Protection of Minorities, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 232, 263 (1992).
51. Philip Alston, Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: the Functions of
Reporting Obligations, BULLETIN OF HUMAN RIGHTS 89/1: IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (U.N. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., GENEVA) 1991, AT 8.
52. Alston, supra note 47, at 491.
53. See ICCPR, supra note 42, art. 40.
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on the reports, which are then submitted to the states parties and the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The HRC sessions
permit NGO representation, although NGOs do not participate in the
deliberations of the meeting. Reporting serves several functions, including:
monitoring performance and commitment, assisting in policy formulation,
exposing states to public scrutiny, evaluating and acknowledging problems
and exchanging information.54
Reporting under the ICESCR has evolved in a slightly different fashion
from that originally envisaged by the Covenant, in part because of the nature
of the rights involved, and also because of the inadequacies of the first
system. The original system, introduced in 1976, shortly after the ICESCR
came into force, involved a three-phase reporting cycle. Each phase lasted
three years, during which reporting centered on a specified cluster of rights.
The first phase covered Articles 6 to 9;55 the second, Articles 10 to 12;56
and the third, Articles 13 to 15." This system meant that a reporting cycle
took nine years to complete. For subsequent periodic reports, the cycle was
reduced to 6 years, but thereafter a state party was required to submit a report
every two years-a program that came to be considered unduly burdensome
and reflective of "an excessively compartmentalized approach to the rights
recognized in the Covenant."58
New guidelines for state-party reporting were consequently adopted by
the ICESCR Committee in 1988."9 These two-part guidelines do not
distinguish between initial and periodic reports, and they cover all provisions
in the Covenant. The first part covers the overall country profile, and general
socioeconomic and political conditions, while the second part specifically
elicits information on the rights in the Covenant.60
The process of reporting allows states parties, as well as the Committees
established under the respective Covenants, to engage in a useful dialogue
over the implementation of the rights contained in the Covenants. 6' Given
54. See Philip Alston, The Purposes of Reporting, in U.N. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., MANUAL
ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING, at 14-16, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/91/1, U.N. Sales No. E.91.XIV.1
(1991) [hereinafter MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING].
55. Work; favorable conditions of work; the formation of trade unions; and social security,
respectively.
56. Assistance to the family; an adequate standard of living-including adequate food,
clothing and housing; and the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
57. The right to education; free, compulsory primary education; and partaking in cultural
life.
58. See Philip Alston, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
in MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING, supra note 54, at 39.
59. Id. at 40.
60. Id. at 40-72.
61. The relevant rights in the ICESCR relating to reporting are Part III, Article 6 (work);
Article 7 (just & favourable conditions of work); Article 8 (right to form and join trade unions);
Article 9 (right to social security); Article 10 (protection of the family); Article 11 (adequate
standard of living); Article 12 (highest attainable standard of health); Article 13 (right to
education); Article 15 (cultural life and scientific progress). The relevant rights in the ICCPR
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the fact that the reporting and other mechanisms under the covenants are
established within a regime dominated by states, and that human rights have
generally been viewed as sensitive matters, the mechanism of reporting can
be described as the best possible rather than the most desirable. At the same
time, both Committees have attempted to project the exercise beyond the pro
forma exercise or diplomatic t~te-d-t~te that states would prefer that it be.62
They have attempted to ensure that reporting is an exercise states take
seriously.6 3  It is thus especially important to consider the nature of the
response of African countries to the reporting mechanisms established under
each Covenant.
1. The ICESCR
The ICESCR is primarily intended to enhance local and global social
justice. It was specifically designed to ensure the protection of the rights to
work; to fair and adequate employment; to education; to social security; to
adequate mental and physical health; to appropriate shelter; and to reasonable
standards of living for all. It also seeks to protect the family, and to protect
minority languages and cultures. The Covenant is designed to promote social
progress, freedom from want, and better standards of life as called for by the
Universal Declaration. As of July 15, 1995, 131 states-including thirty-eight
African nations-have ratified or acceded to the Covenant.64
The main organ for the implementation of the standards contained in the
ICESCR is the Committee of individual experts established pursuant to a
are Part III, Article 6 (life); Article 7 (torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or
punishment); Article 8 (slavery); Article 9 (right to liberty & security of person); Article 10
(humane treatment in detention); Article 11 (imprisonment for contractual obligations); Article
12 (freedom of movement and choice of residence); Article 13 (no-expulsion of aliens); Article
14 (equality before the courts); Article 15 (innocence until proof of guilt); Article 16 (recognition
before the law); Article 17 (unlawful interference with privacy); Article 18 (freedom of thought
and conscience); Article 19 (right to hold opinions); Article 20 (war prohibition on war
propaganda); Article 21 (peaceful assembly); Article 22 (freedom of association); Article 23
(protection of the family); Article 24 (rights of children); Article 25 (partaking in public affairs);
Article 26 (equality before the law); Article 27 (rights of minorities).
62. The two Committees have also sought to make the reporting exercise meaningful
through the establishment of Guidelines which provide for serious examination and interrogation
of government officials on the contents of reports, and which allow NGOs to participate in the
deliberations and present counter-reports. See Alston supra note 58, at 72-73.
63. Alston, supra note 47, at 492-493.
64. The latest United Nations Report on the status of international instruments is dated
December 31, 1994. UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY GENERAL 117-18 (1994) (status as of Dec. 31, 1994) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL
TREATIES]. Reports are issued annually, although periodic updates can be obtained from the
Treaty Section of the United Nations in New York. See International Instruments: Chart of
Ratifications as at 30 June 1994, Hum. Rts. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/4/Rev.10 (1994); Fax
from United Nations Treaty Section, New York, to J. Oloka-Onyango (July 17, 1995) (On file
with the California Western International Law Journal) [hereinafter Treaty Section fax].
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resolution of the UN Economic and Social Council.65  Although not
originally envisaged under the Covenant (and despite the occasionally self-
deprecating remarks by its Chair, Philip Alston 66), the Committee has earned
praise for its efforts to enhance respect for this category of rights.67 Since
1987, the Committee has devoted itself to the creation of mechanisms which
devote serious attention to the effective realization of economic, social and
cultural rights, both through reporting by states parties, and through
continuing dialogue with them.68 In addition to the introduction of its
revised reporting system in 1990, the Committee now takes the occasion of
its biannual meetings to make pronouncements, known as "general com-
ments. 69  These comments have had the effect of advancing intellectual
knowledge and practical action in the field.7
Table I (infra page 72) reveals a number of interesting facts. Nearly
twenty years after the coming into force of the Covenant, over 30% of
African states still have not ratified the instrument. The number of ratifying
states in each decade since the entry into force of the instrument has been
roughly equal,7 with countries like the Gambia, Guinea, Libya and Kenya
leading the way in the 1970s. Of the category of states that ratified the
instrument in the 1970s, four (Mauritius, Mali, Guinea and the Gambia) had
reports which were overdue. Among the latest countries to ratify the
instrument are Malawi, Nigeria and Benin. Malawi's first report is due on
June 30, 1996, that of Nigeria was scheduled to be submitted and considered
at the twelfth Session in June 1995, and Benin's initial report is now overdue.
Among the prominent non-ratifiers are countries such as Ghana, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone.
The late ratification of a country like Nigeria, and the non-ratification to
date by Ghana is somewhat intriguing given that both are prominent and
65. Composition, Organization, and Administrative Arrangement of the Sessional Working
Group of Governmental Experts: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, Ist Reg. Sess.,
Prov. Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc E/1985/17 (1985).
66. See Philip Alston's comments to an interdisciplinary discussion on the right to health.
Institutionalizing Economic and Social Rights, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT
TO HEALTH, 35-38 (Harvard Human Rights Program/Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Centre for Health
and Human Rights, eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE RIGHT TO HEALTH].
67. THOMAS G. WEISS, ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS AND CHANGING WORLD POLITICS
139-40 (1994).
68. The "dialogue" is established via the reporting mechanism, and is generalized through
the committee's guidelines, which are transmitted to the Economic and Social Council and
eventually to the General Assembly. See Alston, supra note 54, at 40-70.
69. See Thomas Jabine & Denis F. Johnston, Socio-Economic Indicators and Human Rights,
at 6 (Paper presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Statistical Association,
Boston, MA, Aug. 12, 1992) (on file with the author).
70. See, e.g., International Technical Assistance Measures (article 22 of the Covenant), in
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report of the Fourth Session [Jan. 15-Feb.
2, 1990] U.N. ESCOR, 4th Sess., Annex III, Supp. No. 3, at 86, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990/3/Corr.1
(1990). See also MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING, supra note 54, at 35-36.
71. Thirteen African States ratified the Covenant in the 1970s; another twelve in the 1980s;
and thirteen, thus far, in the 1990s.
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vocal proponents of the need to address socioeconomic inequities on the
international stage.72 Successive governments in both countries have de-
emphasized the place of civil and political rights and focused on the need for
"development."73 Newly independent South Africa signed both Covenants
on October 3, 1994, and can be expected to join the ratifiers of the instru-
ments, despite serious contestation over the inclusion of economic and social
rights in the national Constitution.74 Of those countries which have ratified
the instrument, over half (52%) have overdue reports, while of the remainder,
reporting is either due at some future point in time, or their reports are
pending consideration. Only Rwanda and Zaire-two countries which do not
have stellar records in the field of human rights-had reached their second
reports.
From the above, it is fairly clear that ratification of the instrument by
African states remains an outstanding question. Many may not regard this
fact as being of much relevance. Consider however, the statement of the
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) in
relation to a much more widely ratified instrument-the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (Child Convention)."
[A] universally-accepted code for the treatment of children is a major step
forward. It provides an unchallengeable platform for advocacy and action
on behalf of children in all countries and in all circumstances, and it
prepares the way for the next and obviously more difficult stage-the stage
of moving from universal acceptance to universal observance.76
No action on children can take place without reference in the first instance
to the Child Convention, which has become a powerful tool of advocacy and
mobilization, as well as a bench-mark from which standards in the area can
be critically and universally assessed. 7  This has correspondingly made
UNICEF and the Committee established under the Convention potent forces
in promoting those standards.7" By contrast, the ICESCR Committee and
72. For the official position on Nigerian foreign policy and prominence in debates about
global social justice, see Ibrahim Gambari, Nigerian Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Concepts,
Critical Issues and Management of External Relations under the Buhari Administration, in
NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIvE YEARS 273-87 (A.B. Akinyemi et al.
eds., 1989). For a critique of the official position, see Okwudiba Nnoli, Nigeria: Foreign Policy
and the Struggle for Economic Independence, in id. at 251-72. On Ghana, see KWAMINA
PANFORD, AFRICAN LABOUR RELATIONS AND WORKER'S RIGHTS: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 91-99 (1994).
73. Akinyemi et al., supra note 72; PANFORD, supra note 72.
74. See Steenkamp, supra note 29, at 113, 116.
75. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 44th Sess., pt. III, Agenda Item 108, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/44/736(1989) (adopted without vote Nov. 20, 1989 by G.A. Res. 44/25), reprinted in 28 ILM 1448
(1989).
76. UNICEF, STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 33 (1995).
77. See Hammarberg, supra note 36, at 17-18, and 22-24.
78. Id. at 22-24.
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the Covenant itself are routinely ignored in discourse and action on the ques-
tion of development and socioeconomic issues,79 when both would have
logically been promoted to play a similarly dynamic finction. ° Unfortu-
nately, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which should
logically promote economic and social rights, has so far manifested a number
of handicaps in adopting a rights-sensitive approach to its international
mandate. 8' Consequently, the most important issue with respect to the
ICESCR from the African perspective, is the issue of ratification. Ratifica-
tion is the necessary first step for all African states which claim to uphold the
ideals contained in the instrument.'a
After ratification, the next critical issue is a timely and serious response
to the reporting obligation. While the lateness of a report may not necessari-
ly reflect a poor human rights situation, reporting is nevertheless an
obligation that the states parties to the instrument have undertaken. 3
Reports should not only be on time, they must also address-in a substantive
fashion-the key issue for which the mechanism was established: the
"progressive realization" of the rights in the instrument. 4 Only in this way
can a nation's respect for and belief in the instrument actually be gauged in
a fair and objective manner.
2. The ICCPR and the Optional Protocols
The ICCPR codifies human rights in the civil and political arena. These
include, among others: the right to life; freedom of association, expression
and movement; and the right to organize. In addition, the ICCPR prohibits
79. Articles 18, 20 and 22 all envisage some link between the work of the Committee and
the specialized agencies and other U.N. organs.
80. This was clear, for example in the run-up to the Copenhagen Summit. During that time,
the ICESCR Committee was completely ignored. It is also clear from a reading of the draft
declaration and program of action that insufficient attention was paid to the provisions of the
ICESCR. In a statement issued to the preparatory committee for the summit, the Committee
expressed its disappointment in the following manner, "The first session of the Preparatory
Committee for the Summit discussed various approaches to, and the possible content of, a draft
Declaration and a draft Programme of Action. In the list of 'elements mentioned for a draft
Declaration,' which is annexed to the report of the first session, reference is made to virtually
every objective recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. However, the Covenant itself is never referred to and most of the relevant objectives are
characterized not as 'human rights' but as mere goals or principles." See Statement by the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Social Summit Preparatory
Committee, para. 4 (May 1994) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Statement by ECOSOC].
81. See infra pages 29-34, and Eide, supra note 20, at 49.
82. In discussing the need for the U.S. to ratify the ICESCR, Henry Steiner makes the
following point, "The mere fight for ratification would expand the rhetoric of social action in this
country; after ratification, the Covenant could be invoked as a legal and moral imperative for
legislative action. Whether internal law or not, it remains a formal international obligation. As
the nation wrestles with the issue, the abstract right would take on concrete expression and
become susceptible to programmatic development." RIGHT TO HEALTH, supra note 66, 41-42.
83. See ICESCR, supra note 2, art. 16.
84. See id. art. 2.
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torture, and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. Although the ICCPR
came into force after the ICESCR, it has been given considerably greater
attention, in part because of the emphasis placed on it by Western govern-
ments, but also because of the relative lack of conceptual clarity with respect
to economic, social and cultural rights.
By July 15, 1995, forty-two African countries had ratified or acceded to
the ICCPR. " Of these, twenty-one were party to the First Optional
Protocol,' which allows for the filing of individual petitions.' Only
Mozambique, Namibia and the Seychelles88 have ratified the Second
Optional Protocol89 abolishing the death penalty.' Strangely enough,
Mozambique has not ratified either the ICESCR,9  or the First Optional
Protocol.' 2 Chad and Uganda are the most recent countries to ratify the
ICCPR, having done so on June 9 and 21, 1995 respectively. 93 Of those
states which have ratified the ICESCR, only Guinea-Bissau has not ratified
the ICCPR. 9  Liberia has signed both instruments but is yet to ratify
them.95 South Africa is in a similar situation.96
There were a total of four reservations to the ICCPR, which, as Rosalyn
Higgins has pointed out, are "rather few," in comparison to those from other
85. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 64, at 117-18; Treaty Section fax, supra note 64.
See Table II, infra, page 72. See also John Hatchard, Ratification of International and Regional
Human Rights Instruments by African States (as at 1 November 1992), 36 J. AFR. L. 186 (1992).
86. Adopted and opened for signature and accession Dec. 16, 1966. G.A. Res 2200 (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) [hereinafter OP]. The First Optional Protocol (OP) is designed to create a mechanism
for the Human Rights Committee (set up under Part IV of the ICCPR) to receive and consider,
"communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set
forth in the Covenant." Id. pmbl. The OP provides for an individual who claims that any of the
rights in the Covenant have been violated and "who have exhausted all available domestic
remedies" to submit a written communication to the Committee for consideration. Id. art. 2. All
such communications must not be anonymous, or an abuse of the right of submission of such
communications, or be incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant Id art. 3.
87. Id. arts. I and 2. An individual petition allows for a grievance by a non-state party to
the Covenant to be heard. The Human Rights Committee must bring all communications
submitted to it to the attention of the State Party which is alleged to have violated the provisions
of the Covenant. Id. art. 4.1, and within six months of receiving the same, the state shall submit
to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any,
that may have been taken by that State Id. art. 4.2.
88. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 64, at 156.
89. Adopted Dec. 15, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
206, U.N. Doc. A/44/824 (1989).
90. Id. art. I.
91. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 64, at 107.
92. Id. at 153.
93. Treaty Section fax, supra note 64.
94. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 64, at 117.
95. Id. at 107, 117 (Liberia signed both on April 18, 1967).
96. Id. (South Africa signed both on October 3, 1994).
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regions of the world.97 While there has been a marked increase in the
scrutiny of African states under the First Optional Protocol, since the hearing
of the first petition in 1978,98 there have only been a few more ratifications
to the instrument by African countries, and the number of individual petitions
remains insignificant. Table II summarizes the position of African states
with respect to the First Optional Protocol.
While this record may appear rather dismal, some observers have viewed
the African response to the Optional Protocol in a fairly positive manner. 99
Thus Odinkalu et al, state:
It is noteworthy that over half of the countries in Africa have ratified the
ICCPR and a majority of these ratifying countries are also party to the
First Optional Protocol. This holds out considerable potential for better
exploitation by African human rights advocates of the procedures of the
HRC. The case law emerging from Africa appears to have made a
significant contribution to the jurisprudence of the HRC. "
97. Rosalyn Higgins, Africa and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights during the firstfive years of the Journal: Some facts and some thoughts, 5 AR. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 55 (1993).
The reservations to the ICCPR have been lodged by Congo (to Article 11 concerning imprison-
ment for debt); Gambia (to Article 14 concerning legal assistance for accused persons; and
Guinea (to Article 48 on signature of the instrument). Algeria presented interpretative
declarations on common Article I to both Covenants (self-determination and dependent
territories), Article 8 (on the right to organize), Article 13 (on the right to education) and Article
24 (on the rights of spouses in marriage). Egypt made a declaration to the effect that Sharia law
should be taken into consideration, and Libya stipulated that accession to both Covenants did not
signify recognition of Israel. The situation regarding reservations lodged by other regions is as
follows: Latin America (4), Europe (22), Middle East (2), Asia (6), North America (1), and the
Caribbean (3). The United States, for example, made reservations to Article 20 (on free speech),
Article 3 (on the right to life), Article 15 (on retroactive punishment), and Article 10 (on the
separation of juveniles from adults). Switzerland made reservations with respect to Article 12
(freedom of movement), Article 14 (on judicial proceedings), and Article 26 (on equality before
the law).
98. See Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, Communication No. 35/1978, Selected Decisions
of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
2d to 16th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/I, at 67 (1985). Examples of the kinds of scrutiny
include: Violations of freedom of movement; rights of association; right to life; women's human
rights; rights to citizenship; and freedom of expression. The reason for such scrutiny is to ensure
that state parties remain faithful to the obligations they have undertaken. The scrutiny of African
countries has covered a number of the rights guaranteed in the ICCPR. For example, in Mbenge
v. Zaire, Communication No. 16/1977, Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee
Under the Optional Protocol, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 17th to 32d Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/2, at 76 (1990) [hereinafter Selected Decisions, vol. 2] the issues covered arbitrary
arrest, the right to a counsel of one's choice, fair trail, and trial in absentia, the death sentence
and political rights. In Marais v. Madagascar, Communication No. 49/1977, id at 82, the
matters under consideration included incommunicado detention, ill-treatment in custody, prison
conditions, the health of the victim, arrest and harassment of counsel, denial of defence facilities,
and interference with the prisoner's correspondence. In Hammel v. Madagascar, Communication
No. 155/1983, id. at 179, the issues examined included incommunicado detention, habeas corpus,
expulsion, and the denial of the right to challenge the expulsion, national security and a general
comment on the situation of aliens under the ICCPR.
99. See Higgins, supra note 97, at 57-59.
100. Chidi A. Odinkalu et al., The Work of the United Nations Human Rights Committee
on Individual Communications from Africa: An Overview, in 8(3) INTERIGHTs BULL. 67 (1994).
What Odinkalu and his co-authors do not address is the impact the decisions of the Committee
have had within African domestic regimes, illustrating the need for a more comprehensive
[Vol. 26
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Implicit in this statement is a call to African human rights activists to
increase their use of the mechanisms. Failure to ratify both the ICCPR and
the Optional Protocols thus remains a serious problem, as does recourse to
the First Optional Protocol by individuals of those countries which are a
party to it. The reasons for the somewhat muted response of individuals
within these countries are varied-from a lack of knowledge of its existence
and the intricacies of filing a petition, to the fear of doing so.' 0' In the
case of Zaire, which has had both the highest number of complaints under
the First Optional Protocol, and was one of the first African countries to
ratify it, respect for the rule of law has greatly diminished, and the opinions
of the Committee on individual petitions are routinely ignored."0 Never-
theless, consideration of individual petitions at the Committee has assisted in
publicizing the dismal conditions in the country."°3 The reluctance to file
individual petitions may also have to do with the requirement that an
individual have "exhausted all available domestic remedies,"" ° which in
many African countries are both lengthy and intricate."5 Consequently,
the overall framework for the administration of justice is hostile and un-
accomodative.
More active involvement with the Human Rights Committee via the First
Optional Protocol would have numerous beneficial side effects for the
observation and eventual realization of economic and social rights. The first
would come from a growing familiarity with the usage of international
mechanisms, permitting the development of a dialogue and reducing
governmental antagonism to the enforcement of human rights. °6 Second,
such a mechanism could also be used for developing more effective and
cooperative endeavors between governments and NGOs, especially in light
of the considerable involvement of NGOs in the representation of individuals
examination of the various dimensions of the issue. See Higgins, supra note 97, at 62-63.
101. Scoble, supra note 21, at 178.
102. The routine ignoring of Human Rights Committee requests to the government of Zaire
have been manifest over the years, for example, in the case of Luyeye Magana v. Zaire,
Communication No. 90/1981, Selected Decisions, vol. 2, supra note 98, at 124.
103. In Ngalula Mpandanjila et al. v. Zaire, Communication No. 138/1983, reported in
Selected Decisions, vol. 2, supra note 98, at 164-68, the petitioners complained of banishment
and internal exile; arbitrary arrest and detention; ill-treatment; persecution for opinions held, and
the denial of the right to take part in public affairs.
104. OP, supra note 86, art. 5.2(b).
105. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Odoki, Reducing Delay in the Administration of Justice: The
Case of Uganda, 5 CRIM. L. FOR. 57 (1994). Odoki cites the fact that of a total of 11,525
remand prisoners awaiting trial in the main prison in Kampala in January 1990, 2,127 of them
had been awaiting trial for more than 480 days; 1,655 for over two years; 525 for over 3 years;
88 for over 4 years, and 6 for over 5. Id. at 76. This meant that the trials of over 4,000, or
nearly one-half of the number, had been inordinately delayed.
106. The methodology employed under the established mechanisms emphasizes diplomacy
and dialogue as opposed to confrontation and embarrassment-methods that states would find
more acceptable than the "mobilization-of-shame" tactics traditionally employed by human rights
organizations.
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at the Committee. " Finally, African states would be able to inject into the
discourse a discussion of their socioeconomic conditions, and ways and
means of comprehensively addressing them in order to enhance the
observation and protection of human rights as a whole."'8 Ratification and
subsequent interaction by African states with the ICCPR would thus directly
enhance the role of the ICESCR, in the progressive realization of the rights
stipulated in the ICESCR.
B. Human Rights in Multi- and Bilateral Relationships
The Development Set is bright and noble,
Our thoughts are deep and our vision global;
Although we move with the better classes
Our thoughts are always with the masses. f09
International financial and development institutions (IFDIs), along with
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and bilateral donor agencies (BDAs)
have long played a prominent role in the field of socioeconomic development
in Africa and the Third World in general. While there are certain salient
distinctions in the manner in which all three operate, there are sufficiently
significant similarities to warrant an analysis which brings them together."0
In the first instance, all are dominated by the countries of the North, and
indeed the donor agencies are an exclusive creation of those countries wealthy
enough to channel their resources into development assistance.' Second,
despite assertions that the administration of development assistance is an
apolitical exercise, it is quite clearly linked to specific national interests, and
a variety of other considerations such as the creation of markets and the
perpetuation of structures of dependency and control." 2 Finally, although
107. See The Limburg Principles on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm'n, 43d Sess., Prov. Agenda Items 8 & 18, at 1,
UN Doc. E/CN.4 1987/17 (1987), reprinted in Symposium, The Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 121 (1987).
[hereinafter Limburg Principles]. International NGOs involved with the Human Rights
Committee include: the International Commission of Jurists-ICJ (Geneva); Amnesty
International (London); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (New York) and Interights (Lon-
don).
108. See KATRINA TOMASEVSKI, DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS REVISITED 137-
138 (1993) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS REvISITED].
109. Ross Coggins, Development Set, in HANCOCK, supra note 14, at viii.
110. For a concise history and analysis of the "aid" phenomenon, see KATRINA TOMASEVSKI,
DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1-12 (1989).
111. Id. at 9-12.
112. See HANCOCK, supra note 14. Examples of linkage include: stipulations that all raw
materials, spare parts, equipment etc., be purchased from the donor country irrespective of cost,
or the possibility of cheaper procurement elsewhere; and that technical assistance be expatriate
(and normally from the donor country) regardless of local availability of personnel. Id. The
design of projects also often takes place with little or no indigenous participation. Id As Lappd
et al. point out in their study of aid:
[Vol. 26
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a number of studies have been undertaken on the linkage between the
operations of these organizations and the observation of human rights, such
studies are by no means exhaustive, nor do they cover all facets of the
issue." 3 This section of the Article considers how these organizations relate
to the African context and what place human rights play in their operations.
1. IFDIs: Structural Adjustment and the debate over 'conditionality' "
The World Bank (the Bank) was instrumental in the design of the
development plans and the large infrastructural projects of the 1960s, and has
continued to play a prominent function in the African development ma-
trix." 5 Likewise, the IMF has evolved to play a significant role in balance
of payments support and stabilization, 1 6 as well as in the programs of
But the heart of their pitch [aid agencies seeking increased disbursements from the
U.S. Congress] is in trumpeting the value of foreign aid to U.S. corporations and the
American economy. About three out of every four dollars in the AID budget are used
to purchase products and consultative services in the United States .... As for the
World Bank and the regional development banks, for every dollar the U.S.
government pays in, about two are spent in the U.S. economy.
FRANCIS MOORE LAPPE ET AL., AID AS OBSTACLE: TWENTY QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR FOREIGN
AID AND THE HUNGRY 90 (1981) (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
113. The most recent study undertaken on the issue, and one which resonates beyond the
specific region with which it was concerned, focused on Australian development assistance. See
The Rights Way to Development: A Human Rights Approach to Development, REPORT (Hum. Rts.
Council of Austl., Marrickville NSW, Austl.) Jan. 1995. For an earlier study, see HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL VIEWS (David Forsythe ed., 1989).
114. Conditionality is the phenomenon which has evolved over time in which development
funding, structural adjustment assistance and budgetary-corrections to borrowing countries is
"conditioned" upon certain economic-performance objectives expected to occur over time. These
include inter alia, the liberalization of foreign exchange markets, deregulation of import controls,
the reform (and retrenchment) of the Civil Service, and increased exports. Failure to meet these
"conditions," may result in a suspension of assistance, or a refusal to renegotiate debt repayment.
Political conditionality (a more recent phenomenon) relates to the conditioning of development
assistance on the implementation of certain civil and political conditions, including (but not
necessarily limited to): the introduction of a multi-party system of government, the holding of
"free and fair" elections, and the removal of restrictions on the operation of the print and
broadcast media. See, inter alia, IMF, Guidelines on Conditionality, Decision No. 6056-&79/38),
Sections 1-12 (March 2, 1979), in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 20 (1983). For a broad discussion of conditionality, see
Anthony Galano III, Comment, International Monetary Fund Response to the Brazilian Debt
Crisis: Whether the Effects of Conditionality Have Undermined Brazil's National Sovereignty?,
6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 323 (1994); AUTHORITARIANISM, DEMOCRACY AND ADJUSTMENT: THE
POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM (Peter Gibbon et al. eds., 1992).
115. For a background examination of the evolution and operations of the bank, see TERESA
HAYTER & CATHERINE WATSON, AID: RHETORIC AND REALITY (1985); CHERYL PAYER, THE
WORLD BANK: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1982) and Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organiza-
tions and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L
L. 553 (1994).
116. See F.C. OSUNSADE, & PAUL GLEASON, IMF ASSISTANCE TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
(1992).
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structural adjustment and institutional reform that have been implemented
throughout the continent since the early 1980s."' These structural adjust-
ment programs (SAPs), variously feature the liberalization of economic
controls, privatization, de-indigenization, ' the introduction of market-
driven economic policies and the promotion of primary exports." 9 Accord-
ing to one source, these policies "appear to have both worsened the economic
circumstances of LIDCs [Low Income Developing Countries] and increased
the desperation of those states to attract foreign capital."' 2' A related con-
sequence has been the phenomenal upsurge in the amount of African
debt. 12'
Initially both the Bank and the IMF were extremely reluctant to be drawn
into the debate on human rights.1 22  However, through a combination of
external pressure, as well as internal reform and orientation, human rights
issues have come to feature in a number of different ways on the agenda of
the two, albeit more so in the case of the Bank than the IMF.123  On the
issue of human rights, the most the Bank has been prepared to say is that
while it has a clear mandate to promote economic and social rights, 124 the
question of civil and political rights is an altogether different matter involving
117. See THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT ON THE POPULATION OF AFRICA
(Aderanti Adepoju, ed., 1993).
118. "Deindigenization" is the converse of "indigenization" which was the term coined for
programs established in the early years of African independence (1960s and 1970s), that sought
to involve indigenous entrepreneurs more intimately in business. It was a type of post-colonial
affirmative action instituted to counteract the domination of business, trade, industry, and
government either by the colonial master, or by non-indigenous communities (e.g South Asians
in East Africa, and Lebanese in the West). Deindigenization thus reverses the programs of
conferring such privileges on the local populace. For a good examination of the phenomenon
of indigenization, see INDIGENIZATION OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES (Adebayo Adedeji, ed., 1981).
119. Sigrun Skogly, Structural Adjustment and Development: Human Rights-An Agenda
for Change, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 751 (1993).
120. Yemi Osinbajo & Olukonyisola Ajayi, Human Rights and Economic Development in
Developing Countries, 28 INT'L LAW. 727 (1994).
121. In the case of Uganda-one of the Bank's "stellar" examples of success-debt rose
exponentially after the commencement of the SAPs. As Mahmood Mamdani has stated,
"Uganda's debt service ratio, 18.9% in the year before the first IMF programme began (1980),
leapt to 55% in the year after it ended (1985)! Current figures set the debt service ratio for 1987
at 59.6%. While the overall debt in absolute terms has remained at a little over a billion dollars
for the past few years, the financial gap ... for Uganda is continuing to grow." Mahmood
Mamdani, Uganda: Contradictions of the IMF Program and Perspective, 21 DEVELOPMENT &
CHANGE 427, 450 (1991). Uganda's current bilateral and commercial debt to multilateral
institutions is U.S. $2,993 million plus U.S. $1.502 million from IBRD/IDA. Uganda: The
Challenge of Growth and Poverty Reduction, REPORT NO. 14313-UG (World Bank, Wash. D.C.),
June 30, 1995, at 4; see also WORLD BANK, 1 WORLD DEBT TABLES 1994-95: EXTERNAL
FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY TABLES) 498-99 (1994).
122. For good overviews of the position of both institutions on these issues, see PAYER,
supra note 115, and HAYTER & WATSON, supra note 115.
123. See Katrina Tomaevski, The World Bank and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: YEARBOOK 1989 75, 79-82 (Nowak & Theresa Swinehart eds., 1990).
For an account of the IMF's response on the issue, see DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS
REVISITED, supra note 87, 59-61.
124. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, Dec. 27, 1945, art. I (purposes), 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S 134 [hereinafter IBRD].
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an amendment to the Bank's founding Charter-the Articles of Agree-
ment.'25 Instead, to the extent that the Bank will become involved in civil
and political human rights, it is from the perspective of the issue of "gover-
nance," described by the Bank's General Legal Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata, as
"appropriate management of a country's resources, based upon rules,
implemented by institutions, to ensure accountability."' 26 He states further
that "[p]roper governance also implies predictability, and legal due process
which, in turn, assumes a government of laws and not a government of
men." 27 It does not require a reading between the lines to discern that the
message being articulated is that the Bank's concern with human rights
extends only so far as they are relevant to the administration of loan disburse-
ments and the implementation of its programs. In short, it takes an
economistic approach to governance.' 28 Thus, some extremely contradicto-
ry actions have taken place in the name of the promotion of "good"
governance.
Most recently, such confusion was manifest in the case of Kenya. There,
the IFDIs initially suspended aid on the ground that there were problems with
Daniel arap Moi's governance of the country,"' among which were the fact
that his single-party state had remained in power for several years brooking
no opposition. 3 ' Aid was restored following approval of economic reform
measures introduced by the Kenyan government.' 3 ' These reforms, howev-
125. Id. Article IV, Section 10, stipulates that the Bank shall not "interfere in the political
affairs of any member" and "Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their
decisions. . . ." Id.
126. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Human Rights, Development, and International Financial Institu-
tions, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 33 (1992).
127. Id.
128. A much more innovative approach to the issue is provided by Serageldin and Landell-
Mills, however the study was not a reflection of the Bank's official position, even though the two
both worked with the Africa Technical Department of the Bank. Despite its strong points, the
paper nevertheless remains mired in an economistic view of the phenomenon of governance. See
Isma'l Serageldin & Pierre Landell-Mills, Governance and the External Factor, (unpublished
paper presented at the Annual Conference on Development Economics, April 25-26, 1991) (on
file with the author).
129. For an account of Moi's method of governance, see AFRICA WATCH, KENYA: TAKING
LIBERTIES (1991).
130. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 56-58 (1993) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITTEE]. Moi discouraged
opposition by harassing and banning newspapers critical of his regime, detaining their editors and
reporters, and confiscating "offensive" publications. Several opposition figures were tried and
detained on a variety of trumped up charges, ranging from treason to embezzlement. Control of
the state-owned media prevented the airing of any alternative voice to the established "party
line." For a discussion of the human rights context in Kenya, see Makau wa Mutua, Human
Rights and State Despotism in Kenya: Institutional Problems, 41(4) AFR. TODAY 50 (1994).
131. The measures taken by the Kenyan government included liberalization of the foreign
exchange market, de-regulation of import-controls and the marketing of export crops such as
coffee and tea, and the enforcement of financial sector discipline. See generally Frank Holmquist
& Michael Ford, Kenya: State and Civil Society the First Year After the Election, 41(4) AFR.
TODAY, 5, 15-18 (1994).
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er, did nothing to improve civil and political human rights in Kenya.
Significant human rights violations, including the stirring of ethnic tension,
crackdowns on the Press and dissidents, and socioeconomic strife, continue
to date.' Next door in Uganda, Yoweri Museveni has maintained a heavy
hand over political opposition under the framework of his so-called "no
party" system of government since 1986.' Museveni's revulsion for and
suppression of political party activity is no less intense than that of his
Kenyan colleague.' And yet, political liberalization has never been made
a condition of aid, principally because Uganda swallowed the bitter IMF
"pill" early on, and now enjoys a favoured position with the Bank and other
Western lenders.' Such examples make it clear that the Bank still has a
considerable distance to cover in the incorporation of a genuine civil and
political human rights element in its development assistance activities. 13 6
While the Bank is much more willing to admit involvement in the area
of economic and social rights, proclaiming them its raison d'etre, closer
examination demonstrates that such involvement essentially translates as the
132. On this point Holmquist and Ford state, "Given Kenya's economic and political
situation and the history of Kenya's donor relations, the 23 November 1993 decision of the Paris
Consultative Group (CG) of donors to renew fast-disbursing aid appears surprising." Id See
also Renewed Repression in Kenya, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, at 16.
133. See J. Oloka-Onyango, Constitutional Transition in Museveni's Uganda: New Horizons
or Another False Start?, (forthcoming in 39 J. AFR. L. 1995) [hereinafter Museveni's Uganda].
134. Museveni has consistently maintained that the introduction of a multiparty system in
Uganda would be inappropriate, because it would simply disintegrate into ethnic strife. An
unofficial ban on opposition parties has been in existence since the National Resistance
Movement (NRM) regime came to power in 1986, and attempts at convening political rallies that
do not have state sanction have been brutally thwarted by the security forces. See Catherine
Watson, Uganda: No to Multiparty, AFRICA REPORT, May/June, at 24-26 (1994); E.A. Brett,
Neutralizing the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of the Military in Politics, 33 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 129, 144-52 (1995); Amii Omara-Otunnu, The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda, 30 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 443 (1992); and The No-Party Price of Peace, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 10,
1994, at 43-44.
135. Measures taken by Uganda include deregulation of foreign exchange controls, the
removal of import-restrictions, and the privatization of state-owned enterprise. See Donatella
Lorch, Ugandan Strongman a Favorite of Western Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at 3.
136. The most recent example of this confusion has occurred with the case of Russia. In
December 1994, an IMF official was reported as stating that "the IMF was not in the business
of financing war loans.... " in response to a query about whether or not credits would be
extendced to Boris Yeltsin. See Anatol Lieven, Economic Black Day for Moscow, THE TIMES(London), Apr. 13, 1995, at 9. In April this year the IMF Board approved a $6.8 billion stand-
by loan (the largest ever to Russia and the second largest in IMF history), without a whisper
about the Cheynyan crisis which has disintegrated into a serious human rights problem. Even
though attempts have been made to broker some kind of peace, Chechnya remains a serious
human rights problem. It is quite clear that Russia is not prepared to allow for the autonomy that
Chechnya seeks. Moreover, in adopting military measures to suppress the rebellion, Russia quite
blatantly used overkill. Instead, the loan was justified because of IMF President Michel
Camdessus' belief in the "bold and ambitious" reforms that Russia has made. See With Strings
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disbursement of ever-increasing amounts of development assistance.'37
Thus, in extolling the institution as a facilitator of the progressive realization
of economic and social rights, Shihata asserts that "the World Bank is
generally viewed by its members as an agency for economic development par
excellence. The Bank's operations have reached numerous diverse issues,
including population, education, health and social security.'5
138
Even if one allows certain concessions to the Bank, these are clearly
undercut by the operations of its chief ally, the IMF. 139  The Bank's
relationship with the IMF plays itself out in a variety of ways, although in
legal terms this is only specified in respect to cessation of membership in the
IMF."' If the link between structural adjustment and the violation of civil
and political rights is allegedly tenuous,"' the same cannot be said about
its connection to the progressive deterioration in the prospects for African
countries to realize the economic and social rights that the Bank is so certain
it promotes. "2  Thus, for example, in a recent critique of the Bank's
137. The Bank spent U.S. $1 billion on basic education in fiscal year 1990, and $340
million on health care, nutrition and population between 1970 and 1979. Between 1980 and 1990
this amount increased to over $3 billion. Shihata, supra note 126, at 30 n. 15. The Bank has
moved to incorporate human rights considerations into both the programming and operations of
its projects. See, e.g,. Michael M. Cernea, The Building Blocks of Participation: Testing Bottom-
up Planning, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 166 (World Bank, Wash. D.C. 1992). The Bank has also
attempted to become less secretive with its information by establishing a Public Information
Centre.
138. LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 130, at 30.
139. For a good examination of the manner in which the IMF has insulated itself from
human rights issues, see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesizing the Soft
International Law of the IMF and Human Rights, II B.U. INT'L. L.J. 81 (1993). For a treatment
of the African context, see FREDOLINE 0. ANuNOBI, THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONDITIONALITY:
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND AFRICA (1992).
140. IBRD supra note 124, art. VI § 3. Article VI, section 3 "Cessation of membership in
the International Monetary Fund," stipulates that, "Any member which ceases to be a member
of the International Monetary Fund shall automatically cease after three months to be a member
of the Bank unless the Bank by three-fourths of the total voting power has agreed to allow it to
remain a member." Id.
141. See Morris Miller, The Folly of Demonology: How Critics View the World Bank and
Other Major International Agencies and How the Critic's Missions Should be Viewed, WORKING
PAPER No. 2, SERIES 12 (MacArthur Interdisciplinary Prog. on Peace and Int'l Cooperation, U.
of Minn.) Jan. 1995, at 14-21. See also Joseph Gold, The Rule of Law in the International
Monetary Fund (IMF, Wash. D.C.), 1980, at 59. Candelaria summarizes the official position by
quoting IMF President, Michel Camdessus, who stated, "Nothing in our articles tells us that we
have to look at the moral quality of the policies of the country. Nor do we have to consider
whether the country is perfectly democratic or not." See Sedfrey M. Candelaria, International
Responsibility of the IMF: Human Rights Standards and Stand-by Arrangements, I ATENEO HUM.
RTS. L. J. 113, 116 (1992) (discussing the IMF's past financing of the South African
government).
142. DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS REVISITED, supra note 108, at 95. Noted
deteriorations have taken place in Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, particularly relating to
the standard of living; freedom from hunger and access to health care. For an analysis of each
situation, see JOHN WEEKS, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND THE ECONOMY OF SIERRA LEONE
(1992); DEADEND TO NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
NIGERIA 1979-1989 (Okwudiba Nnoli, ed. 1993); and JEAN LENNOCK, PAYING FOR HEALTH:
POVERTY AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT N ZIMBABWE (1994) [hereinafter OXFAM REPORT].
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positive self-appraisal of structural adjustment in Africa,'43 Sayre Schatz
illustrates why such an assessment is fatally flawed, and characterized by
either a contrariety of results, mixed findings, or a lack of a significant
relationship between reform, performance and outcome. 44  He concludes
that there are strong grounds to warrant the assertion that the evidence provid-
ed in the Bank's report fails to support the claim that its macro-economic
reforms have promoted African economic growth, and may instead support
the "hypothesis that their implementation has actually impeded growth in
Africa."'
145
But how exactly do Bank/IMF policies affect the realization of economic
and social rights? 4 6 Commencing with a very broad purview, one can see
that, in Africa, the operations of the two institutions work to undermine the
right to self-determination.'47 This takes place in a variety of ways, ranging
from the humiliating fashion in which "Paris Club" debt-rescheduling
meetings take place,' to the issue of conditionality. It extends to the
manner in which Bank policy has become so deeply insinuated in national
policy without the concomitant accountability that usually accompanies
political power.'49 In more specific ways, structural adjustment affects
143. WORLD BANK, ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: REFORMS, RESULTS AND THE ROAD AHEAD
(1994).
144. Sayre Schatz, Structural Adjustment in Africa: A Failing Grade So Far, 32 J. MOD.
AFR. STUD. 679 (1994). See also Douglas Rimmer, Adjustment Blues: Review Article, 94 AFR.
AFF. 109 (1995).
145. Schatz, supra note 144, at 691.
146. The most conceptually clear and empirically based assessment of the impact of SAPs
on economic and social rights is Danillo Ttrk's report to the Sub-Commission. See Special
Rapporteur's Report, supra note 50, at 11-18.
147. Id. at 42. In this context, self-determination is used as the right of countries to freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The right to self determination appears
in article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. This fact cuts to the essence of the interdependence
between both categories of human rights and this is especially relevant in respect of the issue of
accountability. See Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank
and the Democratization of Development, 6 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 159 (1993). For a critical
examination of the contemporary context of self-determination, see J. Oloka-Onyango, Self-
Determination, Withering States and the New Millennium: Prospects and Problems for a
Democratic Future (forthcoming in 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (1996)).
148. See supra note 31. Paris Club meetings are arranged under the auspices of the IBRD
and the IMF and take place every year. The meetings involve the Minister of the country under
review being called into a room of all the major creditors, and asked to justify why the debt of
his or her country should be rescheduled. Such justification includes a demonstration of the
measures taken to address the donor's concerns and conditions raised at the last meeting of the
group, and to ensure that the donee country has complied. Failure to do so means that the debt
will in all probability not be rescheduled.
149. The voting mechanisms employed in the Bank give an inordinate degree of power to
those who contribute the largest amounts to the institution (the countries of the G-7); the design
of the main policies implemented by the institution, is largely executed without developing
country participation, and no liability attaches to the institution in the event that a policy fails.
IBRD Article V (on the organization and management of the Bank) states as follows, "Section
3. Voting: (a) Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one additional vote for each
share of stock held. (b) Except as otherwise specifically provided, all matters before the Bank
shall be decided by a majority of the votes cast." IBRD, supra note 124, art. V § 3(a) & (b).
See also BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD
[Vol. 26
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working conditions and the right to work through retrenchment as a result of
deindigenization, privatization and the liberalization of trade controls.50
The extent of available health care and its cost is severely affected by the
introduction (as in Zimbabwe) of user fees, which is an additional burden on
people who are already impoverished and exist largely in a subsistence
economy."5' The nature of educational services and their accessibility is
affected by the increase in fees for tuition, which affects the ICESCR
provision calling for free primary education for all. 52  Finally, the ability
to provide food and combat overall poverty is affected by the overall concen-
tration on export crops and the removal of subsidies for market staples.'53
Even conservative observers agree that, at a minimum, the IFDIs have the
politics wrong.54
All the above rights are mentioned in the ICESCR, 5 5 but SAPs work
in a fashion which undermines the prospects of governments being able to
BANK: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 5-7 (1992).
150. See discussion, supra note 118.
151. See OXFAM REPORT, supra note 142, at 6-7.
152. ICESCR, supra note 2, art. 13.2(a).
153. For a broad discussion see Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, The Hunger Trap:
Women, Food and Self-Determination, 14 MICH J. INT'L L. 262 (1993). Tomaevski points out
that the Bank's policy-performance criteria determine the extent to which the recipient
government can meet its human rights obligations:
The very notion [of] human rights obligations is challenged by these policy-perfor-
mance criteria. They demand reductions in the expenditure aimed at the creation of
conditions for the realization of rights. According to human rights treaties, human
rights have a priority in public expenditure. The implementation of that obligation
is rendered impossible if the Bank's performance criteria require the reduction of
public expenditure aimed at the realization of human rights. These demand the
reduction of the expenditure in the social sector and introduction of changes in the
cost-bearing, whereby previously public services require payment by users. This, of
course, excludes those unable to pay from access to essential health services or
educational institutions.
DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS REVISITED, supra note 108, at 66-67.
154. Conservative critics accept the logic of SAPs as basically sound. See, e.g., Peter
Beinart, Out of Africa, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 26, 1994, at 16. Such endorsement of SAPs
is distinct from the majority of liberal and critical theorists who argue that the conceptualization
of the programs is fundamentally flawed. Beinart states, "For years, African governments
overvalued their currencies, subsidizing imports and crippling their farmer's abilities to compete
internationally. As a result, between 1970 and 1990 the continent's share of agricultural exports
fell from 17 percent to 8 percent. Ghana, which has stuck to the SAP reforms, has registered
significantly higher growth rates than its neighbors. For twenty years population growth
outstripped food production; now that trend has been reversed in SAP countries." Id. at 18.
Such an analysis of SAPs omits a number of factors, such as the contribution of the historical
and external dimension to the African economic crisis, and the fact that IGOs do not
acknowledge any responsibility for the failures of the time. Lastly, rates of growth neither reflect
the differentiations in benefits, nor the nature of the growth which SAPs promote. These
opinions mark the distinction between conservative and liberal analyses of SAPs. Beinart
nevertheless agrees that politically, SAPs are the wrong mechanism for achieving these
objectives. Id.
155. ICESCR, supra note 2, arts. 6, 7, 11, 12, 13.
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realize them. 56 Thus, one commentator points to the austerity measures
which have prompted widespread impoverishment and pauperization, spurring
riots and protests, "a vicious cycle of political authoritarianism," and the anti-
democratic inclination in the programs which leads to the installation of IMF
and Bank officials in vital ministries and central banks of developing
nations.'57 Another observer has spoken of the "deleterious consequences"
of SAPs including,
a severe deterioration in the abilities of these countries to uphold the
economic and social rights of their peoples. The fundamental objectives
of providing education, health care, housing, and domestic control of their
economies have been abandoned, since SAPs by definition result in cut
backs in funding for such programs. Privatization and de-indigenization,
especially when carried out in conjunction with debt-equity swaps, have
created the potential for loss of indigenous control of critical areas of the
economy. s'
It is thus quite clear that, at a minimum, there are serious problems in the
design and implementation of SAPs." 9 Contrary to Shihata's assertion,
SAPs in fact promote the failure to "progressively realise" economic and
social rights,'I aside from their impact on the political context. 6' Further-
more-whether or not this is an intended consequence-these policies, at a
minimum, directly influence the failure to observe civil and political rights
in Africa. 62 While the Bank has taken some steps to alleviate the adverse
consequences of SAPs, 63 it is clear that a rights-based and rights-sensitive
156. See ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (Frances
Stewart et al. eds., 1992).
157. Alfred Zack-Williams, Sapped Resources, WEST AFR., Jan. 23-29, 1995, at 95.
158. Osinbajo and Ajayi, supra note 120, at 731 (citations omitted).
159. Cf. Margaret Conklin & Daphne Davidson, The I.MF. and Economic and Social
Human Rights: A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985, 8 HuM. RTS. Q. 227 (1986).
160. It is interesting to note that the same results were noted in the Argentine context nearly
a decade ago, illustrating that the IMF has learned little from its SAPs. Id. at 260-64.
161. This was clearly manifested, for example, in the protests by Nigerian academics and
students over the World Bank loan to the country in the late 1980s, in which activists were
detained and variously harassed. See Sabo Bako, Education and Adjustment in Nigeria:
Conditionality and Resistance, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN AFRICA, 150, 171-72 (Mamadou Diouf
& Mahmood Mamdani eds., 1994).
162. Danny Bradlow has argued that the broad-ranging policy dialogue forced on the Bank
as a result of its expansion means that it has been turned into, "an actor in the formulation and
implementation of policy in its borrower countries." See Bradlow, supra note 115, at 559.
Political rights are affected insofar as the policies of the Bank and Fund have evolved to
determine the extent to which the right of association (trade unions), the right of assembly
(workers and students) and even the political system itself (multi-party) are realized in a
particular country. See generally Osinbajo & Ajayi, supra note 120.
163. Positive steps have been taken in relation to accountability, confidentiality, resettlement,
anti-poverty, and indigenous populations. These measures include the institution of a World
Bank Inspection Panel to receive complaints, resettlement schemes which are carried out in
consultation with indigenous populations, and the greater facilitation of public access to Bank
documentation and general activities. See generally Reginald Herbold Green, The IMF and the
World Bank in Africo: How Much Learning?, in HEMMED IN: RESPONSES TO AFRICA'S
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approach continues to elude it. Indeed, even following the wave of
democratization that led to the collapse of a variety of long-standing dictator-
ships-from Malawi to Benin to Zambia-the Bank has still failed to change
its approach to structural adjustment.'" The Bank's insensitivity to the
changed circumstances is evident in its failure to effectively confront the
African debt problem which hangs like an albatross over any reform
efforts.' 65
2. Economic and social rights in intergovernmental
and bilateral relations
a. The operations of intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs): The case of UADP
While the Bank and the IMF are the most prominent international
agencies involved in the African development scene, they are by no means
the only ones. A variety of other organizations, such as UNICEF, the World
Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO),
are directly concerned with the implementation of development in these
countries,'" and thus directly with the realization of economic and social
rights. 67  Of these, UNDP 68 has made the most assertive attempts to
link human rights and development, particularly via publication of its annual
Human Development Report, 169 and the Index of Human Freedoms (the
ECONOMIC DECLINE 54, 71-72 (Thomas M. Callaghy & John Ravenhill eds., 1993); and Daniel
Bradlow, supra note 115. But cf Daniel Hammarschlag, Morgan v. International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 16 MA. J. INT'L L. & TR. 279 (1992), for the view that the
Bank still remains largely beyond sanction.
164. See Nnoli, supra note 142, at 219-21.
165. See David F. Gordon, Debt, Conditionality and Reform: The International Relations
ofEconomic Restructuring in Sub-Saharan Africa, in Callaghy & Ravenhill, supra note 163, at
90, 106-11.
166. UNICEF, for example, has been the main implementing agency of the Convention on
the Rights of The Child, and has issued a number of critical reports on SAPs. See, e.g.,
UNICEF, WITHIN HUMAN REACH: A FUTURE FOR AFRICA'S CHILDREN (1985); and I
ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE AND PROMOTING GROWTH
(Giovanni Andrea Cornia et al. eds., 1987).
167. The UN lists 22 agencies and organizations that have something to do with economic
and social rights. See The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report of the
Secretary General, U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess., Annex, Prov. Agenda Item 8, at 6, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/18/Add. 1 (1993).
168. UNDP was established in 1966 following the merger of the UN Special Fund and the
UN Technical Assistance Board. See Brian Urquhart & Erskine Childers, Compilation of
Statistical Data on UN Leadership Posts, STATISTICAL ANNEX (Ford Found., New York/Dag
Hammarskj6ld Found., Uppsala, Sweden), 1990, at 7.
169. The HDR is published annually by the UNDP, and covers the overall state of human
development for the past year, employing both empirical data, and theoretical frameworks to
elucidate the totality of human socioeconomic existence. See, e.g., UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT: 1995 (1995).
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Index), 7 ° and through articulation of the concept of "sustainable human
development." 7' The Index represents the boldest attempt by an IGO to
both quantify and rank human rights observance. Unsurprisingly, it has run
into considerable criticism from both governments and academics, principally
because of the sources used, and the method of assessment employed. 72
Most problematic was the selective use of human rights terminology, and the
quantification of only political freedoms. 1
7 3
For the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights 74 the UNDP and
the U.N. Human Rights Centre jointly prepared a document on democracy
and development.'75 The document comprised a synopsis of UNDP work
in the area-extending from a variety of peace-building measures, to electoral
assistance, national capacity building, regional support, discrimination and
women-illustrating an eclectic shopping basket, with little internal logic or
(with the possible exception of the last two) connection. '76 The develop-
ment of the Index and the end of the Cold War boosted hopes that the UNDP
would assume a more active role in the linkage of human rights and
development. 177  Preparations for the World Summit on Social Develop-
170. The Index of Human Freedoms was first included in the UNDP's 1991 Annual Report,
and every year thereafter. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: 1991 (1991).
171. "Sustainable human development" has been defined as, an approach that "focuses on
people, investing in them, involving their participation and promoting equality for all; and it
demands sustainability in terms of the environment, economy, society, culture and institutions,
as well as inter-generational equity." See Foreword to the UNDP Series on SUSTAINABLE
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: COUNTRY STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (emphasis in
original). The African countries so far covered in the series include Botswana, Egypt, Malawi
and Sudan.
172. See Katarina Tomaevski, A Critique of the UNDP Political Freedom Index 1991, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: YEARBOOK 1991, 3-24 (Brd-Anders Andreassen
& Theresa Swinehart, eds., 1992) [hereinafter Critique of the UNDP Political Freedom Index].
The human freedom index was criticized in conceptual terms (i.e. that the linkage between
human rights and development should not be made, since the two address different issues), and
for the questionable model used, which was derived from an index that employed differential
methods of weighting human rights. The source used was primarily an index developed by
Charles Humana. Critics of the methodology employed, argued that Humana's index was based
on information of questionable content on individual rights in specific groups of countries.
Furthermore, the weighting scheme he used was arbitrary; the measurement of the magnitude of
change in respect of human rights over time was overly influenced by impressionistic evaluations
(such as the collapse of the Socialist regimes in Eastern Europe), and all of his "human rights"
were civil and political rights. For a critique of the methodology, see Dipak Gupta et al.,
Creating a Composite Index for Assessing Country Performance in the Field of Human Rights,
16 HUM. RTS. Q. 131, 138-62 (1994); and Paul Streeten, Human Development: The Debate
About the Index, 143 INT'L SOC. Sd. J. 25 (1995).
173. Critique of the UNDP Political Freedom Index, supra note 172, at 21.
174. See supra note 3.
175. Human Rights, Democracy and Development: Lessons from the Field, U.N.
Development Programme and U.N. Center for Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, World Conference
on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Prov. Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC-
/61/Add.13 (1993).
176. Id
177. Cf Alston, supra note 47, at v.
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ment further fueled this aspiration. 7 ' The Copenhagen Summit marked
the return of economic and social issues to center stage. 79 Following Rio
on the Environment," s° Vienna on Human Rights' 8' and Cairo on Popula-
tion, 82 the Copenhagen meeting was convened in March, 1995 to consider
the interconnected questions of poverty, economic security and social
progress.113 The Declaration that emerged from this conference marks the
latest addition to the international documents in this genre."'
Unfortunately, many observers were disappointed that human rights
issues were not given more prominence and that UNDP acquiesced in this
178. UNDP was extremely optimistic about the Copenhagen Summit which it described as
"a unique opportunity to redefine humanity's development agenda ... a time to reiterate very
clearly that without the promotion of people-centred development none of our key objectives can
be met-not peace, not human rights, not environmental protection, not reduced population
growth, not social integration." UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: 1994, iii (1994).
179. U.S. President Bill Clinton was long reported as unwilling to attend the Summit as was
British Prime Minister, John Major, reflecting the long-standing ambivalence of Western
governments (irrespective of political leaning) towards issues of global justice and economic and
social rights. In the event, neither leader attended. See David Usborne, Gales of Waffle Threaten
UN's Poverty Summit, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 30, 1995, at 10. Usborne also noted
that "the ambition of the summit's agenda may turn out to be in inverse proportion to its rele-
vance," despite the attendance of over 100 heads of state at the event. Id.
180. See Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development: The final text of
agreements negotiated by governments at the United Nations Convention on Environment and
Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (June 3-14, 1992) in AGENDA 21 AND THE
UNCED PROCEEDINGS I (Nicholas A. Robinson ed. 1993).
181. Supra note 3.
182. See Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, Sept. 5-13,
1994, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994).
183. The UNDP proposed the promulgation of a World Social Charter and the creation of
an Economic Security Council, none of which actually came to pass. See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT: 1994, supra note 178, at 5-11.
184. See Draft Declaration and Draft Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR, World Summit
for Social Development, Mar. 6-12, 1995, Prov. Agenda Item 10, at 6, 7 and 13, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 166/L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Draft Declaration]. The so-called "Poverty Summit" faced
considerable problems, and was at one point in danger of turning back some of the gains made
with respect to women's rights, human rights in general and the participation of nongovernmental
organizations in the formulation of development policies. In the final analysis, reactions to the
event have been mixed, although many were glad that despite the setbacks, at least the issues of
poverty and social welfare were given an airing. According to Nicholas Timmins, of the
Independent of London, the Summit was not all talk:
There was recognition that structural adjustment programmes must protect social
spending on primary education and health. . . . The 20/20 proposal by which 20
percent of aid and of national budgets would go on basic social programmes, received
such an airing that it is hard to believe more countries will not try it .... There was
the first UN call for debt cancellation, and a UK delegation official counted the
summit's best achievement as the way it had 'knocked on the head' the argument that
"you have to have economic development before human rights".
Nicholas Timmins, Just Hot Air in a Cold Climate?, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 13,
1995, at 15. The implementation of the agreed issues is of course an entirely different matter.
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action."' Consequently in the "Alternative Declaration" issued by NGOs
at the meeting, this problem was highlighted:
We believe that the Summit documents fail to recognize adequately the
primacy of human rights as a prerequisite for a participatory and meaning-
ful social development for all sectors of society, especially for children and
such marginalized groups as people with deabilities [sic], indigenous
peoples, people in occupied territories, refugees and the displaced. It also
fails to note how the undemocratic nature of structural adjustment
programmes undermine the rights of citizens and often leads to their
repression. 
The Declaration went on to decry the efforts being made at the Summit to
reverse the achievements of the Vienna and Cairo summits, particularly in
relation to women's rights and in undermining "the possibilities for the kind
of fundamental changes required for the creation of just societies.'"'7
UNDP shares in the blame for the prevarication over the human rights
underpinnings to development. In the first instance, the term "human
rights," continues to be selectively employed in the organization, and is yet
to be programmatically incorporated into its work."I This has resulted in
recourse to an elaborate lexicography which essentially avoids use of the
term. Thus, phrases ranging from "sustainable development"', 9  to the
most recently-adopted "human security," " do not fundamentally differ
185. See Statement by ECOSOC, supra note 80. The lack of prominence given to human
rights issues is clear from their spotty appearance in the draft declaration. See Draft Declaration,
supra note 184.
186. Copenhagen Alternative Document (Mar. 10, 1995) (unpublished copy circulated at
Social Summit, on file with the author) [hereinafter Alternative Declaration].
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: 1994, supra note 178; and DEVELOPMENT
AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS REVISITED, supra note 108, at 52-56.
189. The foreword to the 1994 Human Development Report states,
Sustainable Human Development is development that not only generates economic
growth but distributes its benefits equitably; that regenerates the environment rather
than destroying it; that empowers people rather than marginalizing them. It is
development that gives priority to the poor, enlarging their choices and opportunities
and providing for their participation in decisions that affect their lives. It is
development that is pro-people, pro-nature, pro-jobs and pro-women.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: 1994, supra note 178, at iii.
190. Human Security has been defined as including,
all types of security which involve human individuals and/or groups, protected or
protecting against all kinds of threats found in their human environments. It refers
further to all organizing principles of 'security' based on human nature. It finally
refers to all disasters, man-made or natural, which threatens [sic] human survival.
Human security is 'human' in terms of its reference to human actors, human nature
and human environments.
Kinhide Mushakoji, Human Security: An Attempt to Define a New Concept, presentation
summary at 20, Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) and International
(Vol. 26
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from or advance the human rights approach that has been in existence for
decades, except to undermine and circumvent it. 9 ' Second, like the World
Bank, UNDP continues to equate its work in development with the promotion
of human rights, which, as already pointed out, is not necessarily the case.
The problem of conceptualization and approach is manifest in the
UNDP's more recently-developed Country Strategies for Sustainable Human
Development, which to date have covered four African countries-Botswana,
Sudan, Malawi and Egypt."9  The reports are supposed to present the
range and diversity of approaches by differently-situated countries to the
issue of sustainable human development. 93 However, in the Sudanese
report for example, there is no mention of the thirteen-year civil war, nor of
the serious human rights violations that are taking place in the country. '94
The forced relocation of communities in Southern Sudan is a human rights
issue which covers both categories of rights. 95 To crown it all, the report
praises the government's efforts at decentralization, when it is fairly clear
that this is merely a ruse to escape a democratic handling of the problem of
self-determination for the peoples of Southern Sudan. 96 If there is a prime
example of an unsustainable human rights scenario, it is the Sudan.197
Hopefully, the UNDP will further its attempts to construct a serious and
sustainable human rights approach to development, particularly in the
formulation of minimum applicable standards. 198 This objective is partly
being realized through the development of individual country human
Cooperation Research Association (ICRA) Workshop on "Human Security: Learning from
Change in the United Nations," (held at the Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations, City
University of New York, May 12-13, 1994).
191. See James Paul, The United Nations and the Creation of an International Law of
Development, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307 (1995).
192. These documents were prepared for the Social Summit and represent the diverse ways
in which countries have approached the issue of "sustainable human development." The other
countries covered are the Pacific Island countries, Bolivia, China, El Salvador, Guinea, Pakistan,
Philippines, Turkey and the Ukraine.
193. Id.
194. UNDP (COUNTRY STRATEGIES FOR SOcIAL DEVELOPMENT), THE EXPERIENCE OF
SUDAN: PROMOTING COMMUNITY-LED DEVELOPMENT (1994).
195. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SUDAN: 'THE TEARS OF ORPHANS': No FUTURE
WITHOUT HUMAN RIGHTS (1995). The government responded with the claim that Amnesty's
report was simply an assault on Islam. See Republic of Sudan, The Crocodile Tears: The Call
by Amnesty International for the Abolition of Islamic Laws is a Flagrant Violation of the Right
to Freedom of Religion, Feb. 16, 1995.
196. See Angela Lloyd, The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case for Secession, 32 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419 (1994).
197. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 195.
198. The now-famous "20/20" proposition came out of the Human Development Report, but
the problem may be less in the amount of allocation than in its equitable distribution and the
creation of mechanisms by which such claims can be enforced. See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT: 1994, supra note 178, at 77 & Box 4.8.
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development reports.19 9 Furthermore, at the time of writing, a study team
comprising leading specialists in the field is examining the impact of the
UNDP's development activities on the enjoyment of all human rights.2'
This is considered a necessary first step in the process of establishing an
institutional framework in which the issue of human rights will be brought
to bear upon the operations of the organization."0° The UNDP must be
congratulated for having introduced debate on the issue of human rights and
development into intergovernmental circles. In order to be of continuing
relevance to the human rights struggle, however, the linkage between human
rights and development needs to be made more forthrightly a component of
ongoing UNDP activity. It must also deal with the omnipotence of the
World Bank/IMF approach to development, which is the factor most
responsible for undermining the progressive realization of economic and
social rights in Africa.'02
b. Bilateral Donor Agencies (BDAs)
BDAs, such as the British Overseas Development Agency (ODA), the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Canadian Interna-
tional Development Agency (CIDA), and the several agencies of the Nordic
countries, 2°3 among others, have variously adopted and applied human
rights standards to their programs of development assistance.204 A number
of points can be made of the place of human rights within these organiza-
tions. First, there does not appear to be any carefully thought-out policy
which is consistently applied to the management of development assistance.
With only a few exceptions,' °5 policy in these institutions has in general not
evolved far beyond negative conditionality-namely the policy of withdrawal
of development assistance ostensibly to punish notorious human rights
199. See, e.g., Egypt: Human Development Report 1994 (Institute of National Planning,
Cairo ed., 1994); PLANNING FOR PEOPLE: A STRATEGY FOR ACCELERATED HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT IN BOTSWANA (UNDP et al. eds., 1993).
200. According to sources at UNDP, two specialists in the area of human rights and
development are working to produce a report that will be completed later in the year, and then
will undergo an internal process of review and consideration. Telephone Interview with UNDP
representative (Aug. 1995).
201. Id.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 114-65.
203. The Nordic country agencies are: Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA);
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA); Norwegian Agency for Development
(NORAD), and Finnish International Development Agency (FINNIDA).
204. For a fair treatment of a variety of donor agencies' position on the human rights issue,
see Forsythe, supra note 113, at 119-234.
205. The Nordic agencies, supra note 203, and the Australian International Development
Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), would be the exceptions.
[Vol. 26
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violators.2"6 Moreover, unlike the IFDIs in which there is direct (if only
nominal) developing country participation in the formulation of policy, in the
case of the BDAs, there is virtually none, with "consultation" appearing to
be the preferred modus operandi.27  BDAs nevertheless face considerable
pressure from their domestic constituencies, part of which comprise the
membership of international NGOs working on the environment and human
rights.2"8 Pressure from these consistuencies has influenced the direction
of policy within the BDAs.
A twofold problem nevertheless remains: How can the BDAs make
themselves relevant to the recipients of their aid while at the same time
meeting the onslaught of conservatism, retrenchment and reform that is
currently apace in almost all Western countries without exception?2 9 Rele-
vance in the eyes of aid recipients requires, at minimum, a more democratic
articulation of the notions of participation and accountability beyond the
purely economistic (and at times overtly political) considerations that have
dictated development assistance to date. 20 The dangers of conservatism,
on the other hand, may lead to a re-articulation of development assistance
that is even more hostile to relevant human rights issues.2 ' Nevertheless,
the opportunities exist for a candid and comprehensive re-evaluation of the
arena and of the dynamically altering contexts as we approach the 21st
century. In such a paradigm, the work of international human rights groups
becomes critical.212
206. The Rights Way to Development, supra note 113, at 28. The Council describes current
aid approaches among BDAs as characterized by negative (punitive) conditionality, conceptual
abstraction and autocratic management styles. See also DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS
REVISITED, supra note 108, at 61-86.
207. "Consultation" varies from the contracting of local experts to make a specific input to
a program, to expatriate employees of the agency interviewing specified local and international
experts in the field. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 130.
208. Douglas Hellinger, Managing Director of the Development Group for Alternative
Policies (Development GAP), The World Bank and US AID in Africa: The Tragedy of Structural
Adjustment, the Promise of Broad-based Participation, Testimony Before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs (Mar. 24, 1994) (text available from
Development GAP, Wash. D.C.).
209. For an examination of the issue within the United States context, see, e.g., Steven
Greenhouse, Foreign Aid Under Siege in the Budget Wars, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 1995, at E4;
John M. Goshko, Foreign Aid May be Early Test of New Hill Order, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,
1994, at A14.
210. Supra text accompanying notes 114-65.
211. The phenomenon of aid-expenditure was used (and continues to be used) by the
Republican Congress to justify several cuts to the aid-budget and to the restructuring of USAID.
As Tomagevski points out in the later edition of her book on development aid, the human rights
"hook" is often deployed as a scapegoat to decrease aid, in the arena of domestic politics.
DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS REVISITED, supra note 108, at xiii-xiv.
212. The International Centre for Law in Development (ICLD) has drawn up a Charter that
seeks to hold IFDIs and BDAs more accountable. The preamble to the draft states as follows:
"Development agencies which engage in development activities which impact upon social and
physical environments must promote and protect the rights of those affected by these
interventions. They must enact and adhere to legal measures necessary to secure this objective,
35
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3. The place of international NGOs (INGOs)
Most international human rights NGOs were created with very specific
mandates, primarily in the area of civil and political rights, 213 and have
developed what can only be described as the "traditionalist" approach to
human rights.2 14  This has both its benefits and its downsides. It is
beneficial in so far as it can produce significant effects with respect to the
single issue under scrutiny, such as detention-without-trial, or freedom of
expression. Thus an organization such as Amnesty International-arguably
the most powerful human rights INGO in the world-has become a household
name, and more often than not, will receive the requisite attention from
governments when it wants it, and with positive results.1 5 Such single-
minded pursuit of an issue can be problematic, however, insofar as the wider
contextual framework is concerned. Likewise, the focus on states as the
primary rights-guarantors obviates a critical consideration of the wide variety
of extra-state actors-ranging from guerilla groupings to multinational
corporations, and from development agencies to arms dealers216-who have
come to impact upon, and influence the range and extent of observation or
violation of human rights. 2 '7 Finally, the growing complexity of the field
and be held accountable for the discharge of that duty." Charter to Secure Human Rights in
Development Processes and to set out the Human Rights Obligations of Development Agencies,
pmbl. and premise, para. 1(b), reprinted in James Paul, Incorporating Human Rights into the
Work of the World Summit for Social Development, ISSUE PAPERS ON WORLD CONFERENCES,
No. 3 (Am. Soc. Int'l L., Wash. D.C.), Feb 1995, app.
213. For example, the Human Rights Watch group is concerned with a broad range of
human rights violations, ranging from incarceration without trial to the condition of refugees;
Amnesty International struggles for the abolition of the death penalty and the release of persons
imprisoned for their political beliefs ("prisoners-of-conscience"); groups such as the Anti-Slavery
Society work for the abolition of all forms of bondage, which extend from child labour to
prostitution; and Article 19 is devoted to the eradication of restrictions on freedom of expression
and the fluid operation of the media.
214. The "traditionalist approach" refers to selecting a particular issue (e.g. detention-
without-trial), or concentrating on the violation of a particular civil or political mandate (e.g.
freedom of movement; right to free speech) in isolation from the economic, social and cultural
conditions that give rise to such violations. (e.g. adequate standard of living, right to food, right
to shelter). It also means the exclusive focus on civil and political rights, without any attention
to economic, social and cultural rights.
215. See Peter R. Baehr, Amnesty International and its Self-imposed Limited Mandate, 12
NETH. Q. HUM RTS. 5 (1994). Amnesty International can claim responsibility for the release of
thousands of "prisoners-of-conscience," and was instrumental in convincing a number of countries(Namibia and South Africa among them) to outlaw the death penalty in their Constitutions.
216. In this way, the Arms Project of Human Rights Watch breaks important ground. See
Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War (Hum. Rts.
Arms Project, Wash. D.C.), Jan. 1994.
217. See Shadrack B.O. Gutto, Non-governmental Organizations, People's Participation and
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Emerging Challenges to Regional
Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: YEARBOOK 1991,
supra note 172, at 33. Sahn and Sarris are among those who caution against a dismissal of the
state, and urge a reconsideration of its functions:
While there is strong evidence that the absence of the state improves matters as
regards many economic activities, there nevertheless remain appropriate areas for state
36
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illustrates the links between structures and practices in the civil and political
arena, and economic, social, and cultural factors and conditions. 218  In
sum, the broader structural questions that facilitate the violation of civil and
political rights as yet remain beyond critical scrutiny and action. Clearly,
there is more to be done in articulating an integrated, long-term approach to
the issue.
A few organizations which are better known for work in civil and
political rights have made sporadic forays into the economic and social arena,
or at least attempted to forge a link between the tWo. 219 In this respect, the
excellent report on the World Bank by the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights marked an important and essential break-through for an organization
that has been involved in traditional human rights work.' 0 It illustrates that
such issues can be taken on and accommodated even within a "traditional"
human rights framework. 221 However, even as the Report made efforts to
move away from the traditional focus of the Committee, its primary area of
involvement that have heretofore either been neglected or not well understood. For
example, government ministries and departments have legitimate r6les in agricultural
research, in the collection and dissemination of market information, in extension
services, in targeted transfers to the poor, in infrastructure development and
maintenance and so forth. The challenge, therefore, is to make sure that such
essential tasks are performed and/or promoted by the state as efficiently and with as
little corruption as possible.
David E. Sahn & Alexander Sarris, The Evolution of States, Markets and Civil Institutions in
Rural Africa, 32 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 279, 299-300 (1994).
218. Women's human rights is the most illustrative of this connection, although it is also
manifest in the arena of humanitarian assistance and relief work. See Adetoun Ilumoka, African
Women's Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Toward a Relevant Theory and Practice, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 32, at 307. On the latter, see The Mohonk Criteria for
Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies, STATEMENT (Task Force on Ethical and Legal
Issues in Humanitarian Assistance, Prog. on Humanitarian Assistance, World Conf. on Religion
and Peace, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1994.
219. Needless to say, these have not been abundant. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
INDIVISIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS: TIHE RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS TO SURVIVAL,
SUBSISTENCE AND POVERTY (1992). One major human rights organization that has done a
significant amount of general human rights work is the International Committee of Jurists (ICJ).
Created specifically to uphold the rule of law and the legal protection of human rights, the ICJ
has been fairly prominent in the area of economic, social and cultural rights. See HOWARD B.
TOLLEY, JR., THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS: GLOBAL ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS 137-242 (1994).
220. Reports by the Lawyers Committee include: BROKEN LAWS, BROKEN BODIES:
TORTURE AND THE RIGHT TO REDRESS IN INDONESIA (1993); JAMES ROSS, CAMBODIA, THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS; CRISIS IN CROSSROADS: A REPORT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1988); the annual CRITIQUE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, and HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE
(1992).
221. LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 130.
37
Oloka-Onyango: Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995
38 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
attention was civil and political rights, and in particular the evolving
phenomenon of "governance." m
The focus on the Bank was also justified in terms of U.S. foreign
policy.' Thus, although reference is made to the Declaration on the Right
to Development and the ICESCR,24 the Report stops short of developing
a conceptual framework for a concise examination of the issue of governance
in relation to the phenomenon of economic and social rights.' The report
assumes (and thereby implicitly endorses the Bank's position), that there are
no problems with respect to the impact of the operations of the Bank on
economic and social rights.26 Such a view simultaneously exposes the
haunting influence of the dominant traditionalist human rights perspec-
tive. 7  Governance as conceptualized by the Bank not only pursues a
narrow interpretation of civil and political rights, it also obviates any serious
consideration of the question of economic and social rights. 28  The
Lawyers Committee has since developed its program of monitoring the Bank
and other international financial institutions, and recently released a
comprehensive study of the Bank's operations in Indonesia.229
At the present time, there are only a handful of INGOs that consider the
issue of economic and social rights in any sustained and critical fashion.
Among them are groups such as the Development Group for Alternative
222. Id. at 43-60. The Lawyers Committee adopts a definition of governance as defined by
Joan Nelson:
[It] requires efficient and honest institutions staffed with well-trained people,
enforcing the rule of law impartially and effectively. In order to have honest agencies
that serve the public interest, transparency is crucial (including collection and
dissemination of much fuller information, and a free press). So is accountability
(including ways to throw the rascals out). The channels for transparency and
accountability require a broad array of vigorous nongovernment associations. A well-
developed civil society, in turn, requires not only strong associations but good com-
munications and channels for conflict resolution and growing trust among the varied
groups.
Joan M. Nelson Comment on 'Governance and Development,' by Boeninger, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1991, 289, 292-93
(1992).
223. On U.S. foreign policy, see LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 130, at 3, 30-31.
224. Id. at 33-35.
225. Id. at 34-37.
226. See id. at 34.
227. Id at 34, the Report states, "In several respects, the World Bank has given greater
recognition to the ICESCR .... The very objectives of economic and social rights are to a great
extent also the subject of economic development." Id. See supra text accompanying notes 114-
65.
228. See IBRD, supra note 124, art. VI § 10.
229. In the Name of Development: Human Rights and the World Bank in Indonesia, JOINT




California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1 [1995], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol26/iss1/3
1995] THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN AFRICA 39
Policies (Development GAP), 230 the International Centre for Law in
Development (ICLD)23 and the more recently established Centre for
Economic and Social Rights (CESR). 2  A number of groups that have
been involved in traditional humanitarian and relief work, such as Oxfam,
have also found themselves turning increasing attention to economic and
social issues from a rights perspective. 23  This has resulted primarily from
an appraisal of the devastating consequences of SAPs.234 In the process
they are discovering that governments are no less sensitive to criticism in this
sphere than they are to the condemnation of their records in the arena of civil
and political rights."3 However, as Weiss et al. have pointed out,
Most NGOs working for adequate food, clothing, shelter, and health care,
conducted humanitarian rather than human rights programs. This meant
that NGOs such as Oxfam were oriented more toward practical results in
a country based on humanitarian concerns and oriented less toward
lobbying for socioeconomic rights through the Committee of IndividualExperts. 36
The growing complexities of the humanitarian scene, particularly since the
crises in a variety of collapsing African states (Liberia, Somalia and Rwanda
among them), has led to entirely novel issues which relate to the interface
between human rights, humanitarian assistance, refugee protection and
development.3 7  As yet, there has not been a lucid and comprehensive
approach to the question."3 It goes without saying that this is among the
most vexing issues of the present time, requiring not only comprehensive
230. See the group's flagship report, AID FOR JUST DEVELOPMENT (Stephen Hellinger, et
al. eds., 1988).
231. The ICLD considers itself more of a "think-tank" than a human rights organization
proper, insofar as it concentrates much more on advancing intellectual inquiry and discourse than
it does on advocacy. Interview with Clarence Dias, New York, Apr. 5, 1995. Nevertheless,
ICLD work has considerable influence in the field of development and human rights.
232. CESR was established in 1993 and its most recent publication is on health and
environmental damage in Ecuador. See Rights Violations in the Ecuadorian Amazon: The Human
Consequences of Oil Development, REPORT (Center for Economic and Social Rights, Wash.
D.C.), Mar. 1994.
233. See, e.g., OXFAM REPORT, supra note 142. The process is slow, however. In this
otherwise excellent report, the phrase "human rights" is never mentioned.
234. Cf text accompanying supra notes 114-65 critiquing the Bank's position on these
rights.
235. See Michael Holman, Zimbabwe May Tell Oxfam to Leave, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), Oct. 28, 1994, at 4.
236. WEISS, ET AL., supra note 67, at 139.
237. Cf Constantinos Berhe-Tesfu, Humanitarian Action, Preventive Diplomacy and
Advocacy: The Emerging Role of CBOs and NGOs, paper presented at the UNHCR/OAU
Symposium on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Africa (Sept. 8-10, 1994) (on
file with the author).
238. This point is made, albeit in somewhat anarchistic fashion, by African Rights. See
Humanitarianism Unbound?: Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-Mandate Relief Operations in
Political Emergencies, DIScuSSION PAPER (African Rights, London) Nov. 1994, at 28-39.
39
Oloka-Onyango: Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995
40 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
study, but holistic approaches as well-approaches that must bravely and in
practical terms, confront the needs of the African context. 9
II. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN AFRICA: A REPRISE
There is little need to restate the fact that economic and social rights
suffered as badly in the colonial epoch as did rights of a civil and political
nature.2 40 To the extent that any attention was paid to issues such as health
and sanitation, shelter, working conditions, and the protection of indigenous
cultures, these were largely deemed to flow from the largesse of the colonial
master, rather than from the rights of the colonial subject. 241  As an
extractive system, colonialism was primarily concerned with how much it
could remove and transport to metropolitan industry in terms of material (and
initially) human resources.242 Figures relating to expenditure on defence
and other coercive aspects of the state far outstripped those on any social
service." Discriminatory and apartheid-like policies in virtually every
colonial enclave ensured that the indigenous populace benefitted only partially
from any of the developments of the time.2" As it was based on a system
of extra-economic coercion, colonialism obviously had little time for the
recognition of rights that would threaten or undermine this objective. 241
Against such a background, the policies of independent African countries
have in general been rather puzzling, even for those countries that were
ostensibly more committed to the realization of economic and social rights,
and were not simply paying lip-service to the notion. 21 The puzzlement
is lessened if one considers the fact that economic development was largely
viewed as a right of the State, abstracted from the individuals who constituted
239. See, e.g., James Paul's suggestions on how to begin making international development
actors more accountable to the people. James C.N. Paul, Law and Development into the 1990s:
The Need to Use International Law to Impose Accountability to People on International Devel-
opment Actors, 1992 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1.
240. For a critical examination of this aspect of colonialism, see Jan Breman, The
Civilization of Racism: Colonial and Post-colonial Development Policies, in IMPERIAL MONKEY
BUSINESS: RACIAL SUPREMACY IN SOCIAL DARWINIST THEORY AND COLONIAL PRACTICE 123
(Jan Breman et al. eds., 1990).
241. See FOREDI, supra note 1I; WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA
(1972); BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE
NATION-STATE (1992).
242. See LESLIE, supra note 5.
243. See, e.g., RAMKRISHNA MUKHERJEE, THE PROBLEM OF UGANDA: A STUDY IN
ACCULTURATION 161-66 (1956).
244. See, e.g., id. at 130-33.
245. See FOREDI, supra note 11.
246. Countries that originally manifested a serious commitment to the idea of economic and
social rights were Tanzania, Angola, and Libya. See JULIUS K. NYERERE, FREEDOM AND
SOCIALISM [UHURU NA UJAMAA]: A SELECTION FROM WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 1965-1967
(1968) (On Tanzania); KEITH SOMERVILLE, ANGOLA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY
(1986), and LIBYA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (J.A. Allan
ed., 1982).
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it.247 This was the veneer assumed by most African polities following the
honeymoon of independence, and widely shared irrespective of ideological
outlookY' 8 Thus according to Harry Scoble,
Whether the development scheme is formally state capitalism or socialism,
the socialized investment function is controlled by the single party (or the
"apolitical" military). Top-down planning is the rule. The individual has
a right only to be "developed" at a pace and in a manner determined by the
political elite; the individual has no right to participate in or to influence
this development process-only a distant future right to contingent bene-
fits. 249
In this sense, the State was the 'people.' Both individuals and communi-
ties within the post-colonial State were subsumed in this artificial and
unyielding geopolitical construct, a point sanctified in the OAU's rigid
position on the question of national boundaries.250 In this perverse way,
independence constituted the second and more deadly 'partition' of Africa as
what had hitherto been relatively autonomous communities were forcefully
amalgamated and frozen within the sovereign nation-State.25 A look at the
operation of the premier institution for African liberation and solidarity will
illustrate this and several other points relevant to the present inquiry.
247. Sakah Mahmud asserts: "Although claimed in the name of African ideals, collective
rights serve state interests as well as the few who control state resources. Indeed, most violations
of human rights are often against those who speak out against the corrupt use of state resources.
Those in power resist democratization for similar reasons." Sakah S. Mahmud, The State and
Human Rights in Africa in the 1990s: Perspectives and Prospects, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 485, 493
(1993).
248. The most striking illustration of this can be found in the contrasting examples of Kenya
and Tanzania. While both professed adherence to the notion of "African socialism," the latter
pursued avowedly socialist programs, while the former was for long an exemplar of the capitalist
system on the African continent. See Kibuta Ong'wamuhana, Party Supremacy and the State
Constitution in Africa's One-Party States: The Kenya-Tanzania Experience, 1988 THIRD WORLD
LEGAL STuD. 77.
249. Scoble, supra note 21, at 199.
250. Charter of the Organization of African Unity, art. III, reprinted in 58 AM. J. INT'L L.
873, 874 (1964) [hereinafter OAU CHARTER]. The OAU has maintained the position that the
borders inherited at colonialism (albeit inadequate and arbitrarily drawn) must be maintained in
order to avoid bloodshed, fragmentation and economic disorder. For a good treatment of the
issue of uti possidetis, see J. Klabbers & R. Lefeber, Africa: Lost Between Self-determination and
Uti Possidetis, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (Catherine Br6lmann
et al. eds., 1993).
251. See Mahmood Mamdani, The Social Basis of Constitutionalism in Africa, 28 J. MOD.
APR. STUD. 359, 367 (1990).
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A. The OA U and Human Rights
1. A Background Note
Despite the socioeconomic and cultural legacy of colonialism, the OAU
focused primarily at the political conditions of the newly-independent states
of the continent. 2  Following Kwane Nkrumah's famous dictum, "seek
ye first the political kingdom," a two-pronged thrust was developed." a
This was concerned, on the one hand, with the fragility of the new States and
on the other, with the emancipation of the continent's unliberated colo-
nies." The main concern of the time was the eradication of imperial
domination and the complete liberation of the continent. 55  As a conse-
quence, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity makes only scant
reference to the "welfare and well-being" of the African peoples.5 6 There
is no detailed elaboration of any rights save for those of member States. The
Charter places a particular emphasis on sovereign integrity and non-
interference in the domestic affairs of member States. The primary
focus of the OAU Charter is solidarity and cooperation.58 While reference
is made to the Universal Declaration,2 9 there is scant attention to human
rights principles as such, although general OAU policies were to be directed
toward a variety of activities that could be said to have human rights implica-
tions .2 ° Thus upon creation, the OAU established five specialized Com-
missions,26 of which two, the Economic and Social Commission and the
Educational and Cultural Commission had the brief for economic and social
262issues.
The emphasis of the OAU over the first twenty years of its existence was
political liberation, inter-State conflict resolution and State-oriented economic
252. GrNo NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS ROLE 3-14
(1989).
253. For the background to the establishment of the OAU, see FELIX CHUKS OKOYE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW AFRICAN STATES 121-25 (1972).
254. See C.O.C AMATE, INSIDE THE OAU: PAN-AFRICANISM IN PRACTICE (1986).
255. CERVENKA, supra note 38, at 22-45.
256. See OAU CHARTER, supra note 250, pmbl. (note especially paras. 3 & 10).
257. Id. art. III.
258. Edward Kannyo, The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Genesis and
Political Background, in Welch & Meltzer, supra note 21, at 128, 130-36.
259. Id. Cf. OAU CHARTER, supra note 250, pmbl. & art. Il1.
260. Id. art. II § 2. These activities included cooperation in the areas of education and
culture (section 2(c)), and health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation (section 2(d)). Cf id,
art. III, § 2.
261. See id arts. XX, XXI and XXII.
262. For a general discussion of the OAU's Specialized Commissions, see TASLIM
OLAWALE ELIAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 144-46 (1988).
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cooperation and development.263 The principal right to which the OAU
initially directed its attention was the right to self-determination of colonial
States.2" In the third decade of its existence, from the early 1980s to the
1990s, this focus narrowed to the twin phenomena of Namibian independence
and the liberation of apartheid South Africa.265 Individuals and communi-
ties did not feature in this paradigm of self-determination,2" which explains
the OAU's underlying hostility to movements such as those in Biafra267 and
Eritrea268 that sought to challenge the notion of the inviolability of inherited
borders.269 In this context, it is not surprising that military dictatorships
and single-party governments abounded, allowing for only a limited degree
of recognition and respect for human rights on the domestic front.27 This
produced the paradoxical situation in which the 1960s through the 1980s
were simultaneously the period of Africa's greatest liberation, and its most
brutal suppression. Thus the lament of the organization's newest mem-
ber-Eritrea's Isias Afeworki-at the 30th anniversary summit meeting in
June, 1993, is quite understandable,
Although the OAU has often championed the lofty ideals of unity,
cooperation, economic developments, human rights and other worthy
objectives, it has failed seriously to work towards their realisation....
Thirty years after the foundation of this organisation our continent remains
affected by growing poverty and backwardness.... The African continent
is today a marginalized actor in global politics and the world economic
263. An exception could be said to be the OAU's response to the refugee question, the
normative expression of which is found in the 1969, OAU Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of the Refugee Problem, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S 45 (entered into force June 20,
1974) [hereinafter OAU Refugee Convention]. However, despite the extremely broad and liberal
definition of the term "refugee" in this document, it clearly favored the principles of non-
interference and the maintenance of the fragile security of the new states.
264. S. Kwaw Nyameke Blay, Changing African Perspectives on the Right of Self-
determination in the Wake of the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 29 J. AFR. L.
147, 149-53 (1985).
265. The contribution of the OAU and the Frontline states to the eventual liberation of the
continent cannot be denied. However, as the organization itself admitted, such attention to
liberation over shadowed other questions such as the observation of human rights.
266. See R. McCorquodale, Self-determination beyond the colonial context and its potential
impact on Africa, 4 AFR. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 592 (1992).
267. Blay, supra note 264, at 151.
268. Minasse Haile, Legality of Secession: The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
479, 504-05 (1994).
269. OAU hostility to these movements is enshrined in Art. II l(c) of the OAU Charter,
which commits the organization "to defend their [African states] sovereignty, their territorial
integrity and independence." Article III (3) stipulates that OAU members "solemnly affirm and
declare their adherence [to the principle of] respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence." See also Malcolm Shaw,
International Law and Intervention in Africa, 8 INT'L REL. (London) 341 (1985).
270. See Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An
Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339 (1995).
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order. Africa is not a place where its citizens can walk with raised heads,
but a continent scorned by all its partners.27 '
To the extent that there were any achievements on the front of economic
development, these have been largely sporadic and limited to individual
countries.272 Nowhere, however, not even in the most affluent of states,
has there been a concerted effort to establish a regimen that sought to view
such issues as rights73
2. The Question of Refugees
In the sphere of refugees, the OAU fared somewhat better, recognizing
early on that the plight of this vulnerable category of people was in need of
urgent protection.274 Hence, in 1969 the organization promulgated the
Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugees in Africa,27 albeit over
some initial resistance and prevarication.276 While the intention of the 1969
Convention was to complement its international counterpart-the earlier 1951
United Nations Convention7-it is especially renowned for its definition
of the term "refugee"278 which is significantly more expansive than the
271. From speech by Isias Afeworki at the OAU Annual Summit of Heads of State and
Government, quoted in Bernard Levin, The Hearts of Darkness, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 24,
1993, at 14. Afeworki was elected President of Eritrea in 1993. Afeworki was not the first
(and probably not the last) African leader to criticize the organization. He was preceded by two
Ugandan leaders-Godfrey Binaisa and Yoweri Museveni. The former came to power following
the ouster of Idi Amin in 1979, the latter ascended to power in 1986 on the back of a guerilla
uprising which witnessed significant bloodshed and turmoil.
272. A few countries, like Mauritius and Botswana were largely able to sustain an
impressive rate of economic growth and development. In the 1994 Human Development Index,
Mauritius ranked first among all African countries (60 overall) and Botswana fourth (with a
ranking of 87 overall). See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: 1994, supra note 178, Hum. Dev.
Index Thl. 1, 129-131.
273. See Mahmud, supra note 247, at 494. At the turn of the decade, however, several
African countries underwent political reform, debunking the single-party dictatorships that had
been in power for decades. While there are some successful transitions to cite (such as Malawi
and Zambia), there have also been several disappointments. See Jan Kees van Donghe, Kamuzu's
Legacy: the Democratization of Malawi, 94 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 227 (1995); Zambia: Life After
Debt, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 34.
274. See SAM. A. AIBONI, PROTECTION OF REFUGEES IN AFRICA 1-5 (1978).
275. OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 263. For an analysis of the background to the
promulgation of the Convention, see Joe Oloka-Onyango, Plugging the Gaps: Refugees, OA U
Policy, and the Practices of Member States in Africa, ISSUE PAPER (U.S. Comm. for Refugees,
Wash. D.C.), Oct. 1986.
276. See AMATE, supra note 254, at 460-65.
277. UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
(entered into force on Apr. 22, 1954); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223 (incorporating the text of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees)
[hereinafter Geneva Convention on Refugees].
278. The OAU Convention defines a refugee as; "every person who, owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disrupting public order in either
part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality is compelled to leave his place of
habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or
nationality." OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 263, art. I. See also J. Oloka-Onyango,
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definition adopted in the earlier instrument. 279 Many commentators have
asserted that this is due to traditional "African hospitality." 280 The situa-
tion on the ground however, does not always quite conform to such a
description."' Some observers describe this attitude towards the African
refugee situation as ethnocentric and playing directly into Western desires
and current designs in the field of immigration policy.2a2
With respect to human rights, the 1969 Convention was equivocal.
While Article IV prohibits discrimination against all refugees on the grounds
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, it did not go as far as providing a catalogue of specific
rights for refugees.283  The Convention was more sensitive to the mainte-
nance of harmonious relationships between African states, than it was to the
Human Rights, the OA U Convention and the Refugee Crisis in Africa: Forty Years After Geneva,
3 INT'L J. OF REF. L. 453 (1991).
279. A refugee is any person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside of the country of his nationality and is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it." Geneva Convention on Refugees, art. 1 para. 2. supra
note 278. See Eduardo Arboleda, Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The Lesson
of Pragmatism, 3 INT'L J. OF REF. L. 185, 194-95 (1991).
280. See Art Hansen, African Refugees: Defining and Defending their Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 139, 153 (Ronald Cohen et al. eds., 1994).
African "traditional hospitality" is described as the belief in African brotherhood and the notion
"I am because we are, and because we are, therefore I am." See Shashi Tharoor, The
Universality of Human Rights and the Relevance to Developing Countries, 60 NORDIC J. INT'L
L. 139, 142 (1991).
281. See GAIM KIBREAB, AFRICAN REFUGEES: REFLECTIONS ON THE AFRICAN REFUGEE
PROBLEM (1985) (especially chapter 4). The reasons for such growing inhospitability are several,
ranging from a rise in xenophobia, to the environmental, social, and economic impact of hosting
refugees. In addition, the growth of "donor fatigue" with the seemingly interminable crises in
Africa, has led to a marked reduction of assistance to both governments and refugees. The
situation is often complicated where there is a civil conflict and the host government is
supporting one faction against another. See, e.g., Howard French, At Border: Hospitality Comes
to Grief N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1995, at A5.
282. Chris Bakwesegha, Forced Migration and the OA U Convention, in AFRICAN REFUGEES:
DEVELOPMENT AID AND REPATRIATION, 3, 13 (Howard Adelman & John Sorenson, eds., 1994).
Western governments are tightening their borders, particularly to so-called "economic migrants,"
who emanate mainly from the countries of the South. These policies have a direct impact on
those seeking asylum. However, Western governments use the "traditional hospitality" argument
to assert that the regional mechanism for refugee applicants in Africa is adequate and sufficient
to cater to the needs of a person fleeing persecution in the region. Therefore, why should they
flee such a "hospitable" environment? See id. (pointing out that the arguments of aid reduction
etc., using the "traditional hospitality" argument as an excuse, are being advanced when "some
European countries are not only tightening their immigration laws but also fragrantly violating
the 1951 UN Convention").
283. Cf Geneva Convention on Refugees, supra note 277, chs. II,111, and IV.
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rights of refugees as such.2" Hence, it could be asserted that the OAU
Convention was protective of refugees qua refugees by default, rather than
by design.2a It remains a fact that discrimination against refugees has been
one of the most enduring problems of the African refugee scene.6
Furthermore, one of the most contentious issues with regard to the African
refugee question has been the recognition that they too have rights,' a fact
that is vividly demonstrated in the refugee crises afflicting Africa today, and
the nature of the OAU response to them. 8
It was not until 1981 and the promulgation of the Banjul Charter that the
OAU gave normative recognition to the individual and to 'peoples' as the
subjects of rights.28 9  Nineteen eighty-one also coincided with the publica-
tion of the OAU's most elaborate program on social and economic develop-
ment-the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) . 2  The LPA was designed to
propel the continent into the 21st century with the establishment of an
African Economic Community (AEC) by the year 2000.291 In 1989, the
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) released the African Alternative
284. The UNHCR makes the same point in a rather more subtle and diplomatic fashion,
pointing out that beyond filling the gaps left by the 1951 Convention, the OAU was more
concerned about several other matters, including the issue of "subversion." The prohibition
against "subversive activities" is part of the duties contained in Article III of the OAU Refugee
Convention. See UNHCR, Issues and Challenges in International Protection in Africa, INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. (Special issue) 55, 58 (July 1995). Although not defined, the meaning of "sub-
versive activities" is largely taken to mean the use of arms against the home government of the
refugee, with a particular emphasis on the issue of armed attacks. For an examination of the
broader dimensions of the issue of "subversion," see LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
AFRICAN EXODUS: REFUGEE CRISIS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 1969 OAU CONVENTION, 10-11,
31, 91-92 (1995).
285. Several individual states enacted legislation that affirmed the equality of refugees and
proceeded to confer on them a variety of rights which go beyond the Convention. Cf Peter
Nobel, National Law and Model Legislation on the Rights and Protection of Refugees in Africa,
in AFRICAN REFUGEES AND THE LAW 58, 73 (Goran Melander & Peter Nobel, eds., 1978).
286. AIBONI, supra note 274, at 76-81, 83-107, and Roger Winter, Ending Exile: Promoting
Successful Reintegration of African Refugees and Displaced People, in Adelman & Sorenson,
supra note 282, at 159-71. Examples of discrimination against refugees include restrictions on
their freedom of movement, rights of association, and their liberty to express themselves through
the media.
287. This is especially the case with respect to economic and social rights. See Gaim
Kibreab, Refugees in the Sudan: Unsolved Issues, in Adelman & Sorenson, supra note 282, at
62-63.
288. This is most acutely reflected in the woeful status of the Bureau for Refugees at the
OAU Secretariat, which is supposed to be the principle agency for refugee issues on the
continent. In particular, it is manifest in the greatly diminished attention devoted to protection
issues. See also J. Oloka-Onyango, The Place and Role of the OAU Bureau for Refugees in the
African Refugee Crisis, 6 INT'L J. REF. L. 34, 47-49 (1994).
289. For a detailed discussion of the various meanings of the term 'peoples' as used in the
African Charter, see Richard N. Kiwanuka, The Meaning of "People" in the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 80 (1988).
290. LPA, supra note 40.
291. See generally AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
(M.A. Ajomo & Omobola Adewale, eds., 1993).
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Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SA) 292 -intended
as the African reply to the stringent austerity measures imposed by the IMF,
which commenced in the early 1980s. Together, the three documents
provide a basis from which to arrive at a more complete picture of the
approach to economic and social rights from the continental perspective. We
begin with an examination of the first, the Banjul Charter.
B. Economic and Social Rights in the Banjul Charter
1. The Normative Framework
The Banjul Charter, which has often been extolled as a unique conceptu-
alization of the notion of human rights,293 contains several provisions on
economic and social rights.29 It also has a number of newly-codified
rights, such as the right to development,295 the right to peace, 296 and the
right to a healthy environment,21 marking itself out as the first interna-
tional instrument to enshrine such rights. 29  The preamble to the Charter
clearly demonstrates where the emphasis of the document lies, stipulating that
it was henceforth essential to pay particular attention to the right to
development, and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from
292. African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-
Economic Recovery and Transformation, U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, U.N. Doc.
E/ECA/CM. 15/6/Rev.3 (1989) [hereinafter AAF-SAP].
293. Rose M. D'Sa, Human and Peoples' Rights: Distinctive Features of the African
Charter, 29 J. AFR. L. 72 (1985).
294. Banjul Charter, supra note 39, arts. 14, 15, 16 & 17. Article 18 concerns the family
and contains the only affirmative provision in an international instrument compelling the state
to ensure the elimination of all discrimination against women, thereby collapsing the artificial
dichotomy between the private and public spheres. Id. art. 18.
295. Id. art. 22.
296. Id. art. 23.
297. Id. art. 24.
298. Julia Swanson, The Emergence of New Rights in the African Charter, 12 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. INT'L & COvP. L. 307, 315-24 (1991). But see Mutua:
The addition of peoples' rights, the right to development, and social and economic
rights, to civil and political rights is seen as a major breakthrough. It is not realized,
though, that the pious inclusion of these rights is negated by the power arrogated to
the state to deny civil and political rights in the name of national unity, morality,
security, development and solidarity. How can these rights be realized without free
political mobilization and participation by the masses of the people? How, under
repressive conditions, can a people exercise both internal and external self-determina-
tion? Seen in this light, these "aspirational" rights amount to mere slogans.
Makau wa Mutua, The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective, in REGIONAL
SYSTEMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN AFRICA, AMERICA AND EUROPE: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE THIRD AFRO-AMERICO-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, Strasbourg, June 15-19, 1992, at 12, 13,
56 (Wolfgang Benedek, ed., 1992).
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economic, social and cultural rights in conception as well as universality. 299
While some observers have argued that this statement is merely an assertion
of the necessity to consider development as a right and of the interconnected-
ness of the two categories of rights,3" it is interesting to note that the
preamble goes on to state that "the satisfaction of economic, social and
cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political
rights. "301
Examined in light of the extensive claw-back clauses attending the
recognition of civil and political rights in the document,3°2 such an empha-
sis was clearly not accidental. Indeed, the bias in the Charter led some early
commentators to believe that in the process of implementation of the Charter,
the African Commission would, "undoubtedly grant a State great(er) latitude
if economic and social rights are promoted at the expense of civil and
political rights."303 The record of the Commission to date, manifests no
such bias, raising questions once again, about the extent of the commitment
manifested in the Preamble to the Charter.
Given that emphasis, and in light of the post-colonial history of the
continent, one would expect that the substantive aspects of the instrument
would amplify the focus on economic and social rights.3 5 However, a
critical examination of the specific rights in the Charter raises questions about
the manner in which they were couched, and about the extent of the
commitment of the OAU to their realization.3" Such ambivalence can be
299. See Banjul Charter, supra note 39, pmbl. (emphasis added).
300. See D'Sa, supra note 293, at 78-79.
301. Banjul Charter, supra note 39, pmbl., para. 8 (emphasis added).
302. See Evelyn Ankomah, Towards an Effective Implementation of the African Charter, 8
INTERIGHTS BULLETIN 60 (1994). See, e.g., Article 9, section 1 of which clearly states that every
individual shall have the right to "receive information." Section 2 of the same article, however,
states that every individual "shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within
the law." An immediate problem emerges in the area of press freedoms and the expression of
opinions that are politically unacceptable to the ruling powers. Thus, several laws, such as those
on sedition, criminal libel, and even treason, are invoked in order to delimit the extent to which
an individual is able to "express and disseminate" their opinions. Other clauses containing claw-
back phrases include: Article 6 (liberty); Article 8 (on freedom of conscience); Article 10 (free
association); Article I 1 (right to free assembly), and Article 12 (freedom of movement and
residence).
303. Richard Gittelman, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal
Analysis, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 667, 687 (1982).
304. This is clear, for example, from the reports of the Commission, and, as we shall later
see from commentary by Commission members. For an example of the former, see International
Commission of Jurists, Report on the 10th Ordinary Session of the African Commission, 47 FOR
THE RULE OF LAW: THE REVIEW 51 (1991).
305. The history of post-colonial Africa has been plagued by economic turmoil. See LESLIE,
supra note 5.
306. Despite having created a Commission to enforce the realization of the rights in the
Banjul Charter, the manner of reporting (Pt. II, Ch. III) and especially the principles of
confidentiality, manifest a lukewarm commitment to the full realization of human rights in
Africa. See INTERIGHTS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS
PROCEDURES: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY WITH REFERENCE TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN
& PEOPLES' RIGHTS (October 1993).
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retraced to the preparatory discussions over the Charter, and found in the
rapporteur's account of the debate over the issue.3" In addition, a system-
atic consideration of the articles will reveal something else, namely a
lukewarm commitment to the application of critical and genuinely progressive
standards in the area. For example, the Charter is silent on the right to
create trade unions-a fundamental aspect of the right to work, and the
freedom of association and organization of labour.1 8 The absence of such
a right must be considered in view of the claw-back clause enshrined in
Article 10, which provides for freedom of association."°  Article 10
stipulates that the right is exercisable provided that the individual "abides by
the law";30 this when numerous domestic legal regimes around the
continent outlaw or severely proscribe trade union formation and activi-
ty.3 ' The problem is compounded by Article 29, concerning the duty to
preserve and strengthen "national solidarity," which could be (and has been)
interpreted to mean any oppositional activity, whether in the political or
economic sphere." 2
The Charter also produced a number of surprises, the first being the
guarantee of the right to property,3"3 a right which does not appear in the
international Covenants,3 4 and is clearly of questionable facility in the
African context for a number of reasons. First, is its association with
individual privilege, and vested (largely colonial and neo-colonial) interests
in a context which has been plagued by exploitative relations deriving from
property ownership and unequal exchange.3"5 Second, it raises questions
about the issue of tenurial rights, land reform and equality in access to
land-serious questions for both the rural and urban poor in independent
307. Report on the Final Drafting of the African Charter on the Human and Peoples'
Rights, Nairobi Ministerial Mtg., 1981, Annex I, at 4, OAU Doc. CM/1149 (XXXVII). See
Scoble, supra note 21, at 194.
308. The right to strike is likewise ignored in the Charter. Scoble, supra note 21, at 194.
309. See supra note 302.
310. Banjul Charter, supra note 39, art. 10.
311. Such justification of "national solidarity" has not only led to the proscription of
opposition political activity, but also to the compulsion of people to become members of the sole
ruling party. See Mwesiga Baregu, The Rise and Fall of the One-Party State in Tanzania, in
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 158, 160-165
(Jennifer Widner, ed., 1994). The exercise of trade union rights in African countries, is still a
problem irrespective of the so-called wave of democratization that has been blowing since the
late 1980s, and illustrated by the response of the Nigerian military government to strike action
by petroleum workers, and the refusal of the Kenyan government to recognize the formation of
an association for University personnel. See, e.g., Doyin lyiola, Nigeria: Abacha's Bloody Crisis,
AFRICAN TOPICS (London), Oct./Nov., 1994, at 14-15.
312. Banjul Charter, supra note 39, art. 29.
313. See id. art. 14.
314. Article 17 of the Universal Declaration refers to the right to own property, but neither
of the Covenants do so. See Universal Declaration, supra note I, art. 17; ICESCR, supra note
2; ICCPR, supra note 42.
315. See generally FOREDI, supra note 11, at 57-119.
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Africa and directly related to a series of other rights.3"6 Given both these
issues, one would imagine that such a provision should have attempted to
render a dynamic and qualitatively different conceptualization of the right.
Furthermore, it has also been pointed out that feminist analysis could take
note of and progressively utilize the right to the acquisition and inheritance
of property in Article 14 in such a way as to defeat customary practices that
inordinately deprive women of their property rights."' However, the
Banjul Charter gives no indication that this is the direction in which it
intended to move with respect to this right.3"8 In the final analysis, the
Charter made no creative attempt to re-interpret the right as a mechanism of
empowerment of Africa's dispossessed masses and to foster conditions of
equality in its exercise.319
Article 15 stipulates that every individual has the right to work under
equitable and satisfactory conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal
work.32 Economic conditions and the fact that the majority of the popula-
tion are self-employed subsistence farmers place limitations on the extent to
which this right can be realized.32" ' There are nonetheless several dimen-
sions from which the article could be approached in order to achieve its
positive recognition and progressive realisation, with particular regard to
working conditions and the principle of equality. 3"
Article 16 covers the best attainable state of mental and physical health,
and the obligation to take the necessary measures to protect the health of the
people and to give medical attention to the sick.3" Finally, Article 17
covers the right to education.324 Unlike the ICESCR equivalent, the article
does not mention free primary education, despite the guarantee of such
facility being a staple-usually by the year 2000!-of African politics.3 25
316. On the various dimensions and interconnectedness of the issue of land rights to other
human rights, see ALBIE SACHS, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NEW SOUTH AFRICA 104-38
(1990).
317. Cf Rebecca Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 125, 139-40 (1994).
318. For an excellent treatment of this issue, see Florence Butegwa, Using the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights to Secure Women's Access to Land in Africa, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 32, at 495.
319. See SHIVJI, supra note 10, at 102-03.
320. Banjul Charter, supra note 39, art. 15.
321. The 1994 Human Development Report has the following figures: For Sub-Saharan
Africa, the average life expectancy is 51.1; adult literacy is 51 percent, per capita GNP stands
at U.S. $540, in comparison to a world average of U.S. $4,160, and U.S. $14,920 for industrial-
ized countries. See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: 1994, supra note 178, at 213-18, tbl. 52.
322. These dimensions include rural and/or plantation work; health and safety; and the
exploitation of child labour.
323. See Banjul Charter, supra note 39, art. 16.
324. See id. art. 17.
325. The guarantee of universal education is of course a significant vote-catcher, given the
high premium placed on education in the African context; why it is never realized relates to the
fact that it is only a campaign issue. Once in government, resources are diverted elsewhere.
[Vol. 26
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Missing from the Charter are the rights to social security, the right to an
adequate standard of living, and freedom from hunger, all of which are
contained in the ICESCR.326 Of these, the absence of the last-the right
to food-is perhaps the most striking.327 The omission can nevertheless be
retraced to the fact that while ecology and environment provide some
explanation for the food crises that have afflicted the continent, the dominant
problems are political and socioeconomic, namely, the lack of adequate food
security policies, and the extra-economic coercion of the peasantry.3 28
Both are a product of and facilitated by the inordinate concentration on
export-crop production, which characterizes the majority of African
economies.329 Compounding the problem is the failure to devise amicable
means for the resolution of conflicts, frequently resulting in war and
famine.330
What, in the final analysis can be said of the Banjul Charter's position
on economic and social rights? First, the content of the articles is a
significant letdown from the promise of the Preamble, and belies what could
have been an altogether novel and radical approach to the interconnectedness
of the two categories of rights. Second, the focus of these rights is primarily
the external dynamic-the elements of historical exploitation and contempo-
rary maldevelopment-without a parallel approach to the inequities of the
domestic arena. Apart from what the Charter contains, what it fails to
mention speaks even louder of the actual position of African leaders on these
rights. Finally, the extensive restrictions in the recognition of civil and
political rights, redound negatively on the possibilities for the progressive
realization of the few economic and social rights contained in the document.
326. See ICESCR, supra note 2, arts. 9, 11.
327. See Clarence Dias, Food Security and the Right to Food: Legal Resources and
Grassroots Action, WORKING PAPER No.3 (SERIES 8), (MacArthur Interdisciplinary Prog. on
Peace & Int'l Cooperation, Univ. of Minn.) Mar. 1993.
328. Mahmood Mamdani, Disaster Prevention: Defining the Problem, 37 MONTHLY REV.
35, 36-37 (1985). Extra-economic coercion extends from the imposition of taxes by the local
chief and government administration, to the extraction of "gifts" (bribery) from administrative
personnel. On the origins of the coercive role of administrative personnel, see J. Oloka-Onyango,
Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda, WORKING PAPER No. 30 (Centre for Basic
Research, Kampala, Uganda), 1993, at 9-15.
329. See George W. Shepherd, Jr., The Denial of the Right to Food: Development and
Intervention in Africa, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 528, 531 (1985). The 1994 Human Development
Report gives an overall average Export-import ratio for Sub-Saharan Africa of 120%. See
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: 1994, supra note 178. at 169, tbl. 20.
330. Several ongoing conflicts in Africa have failed to be resolved in an amicable fashion.
These include the 13-year civil war in the Sudan and the factional fighting in Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and Angola.
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2. The Question of Implementation
Having been ratified by the requisite number of African states, the
Banjul Charter came into force only five years after promulgation.",
While the fairly speedy ratification of the instrument was welcome, the fact
remains that the mechanisms providing for the enforcement of the rights in
the Charter are weak. 3 2 Furthermore, both the publicity about the Charter
and the creation of the Commission have thus far done little to encourage
petitions relating to economic and social rights.333 Indeed, the past
Commission Chairman (in a rather pointed reversal of the explicit philosophy
of the Charter), stated that the Commission would concentrate on civil and
political matters." This was necessary, he argued, because any attempt
to deal with economic and social rights would "result in too many cases and
in too many countries" to cope with.335 Such an attitude may partially
explain why, of the more than 140 communications received to date under
the complaints mechanism of the Charter,336 none have related to Articles
14 to 17-the provisions in the Charter relating to economic and social
rights."'
The evolution of the African Commission has been steady, but
unremarkable,33 with significant resolutions being recently adopted on
331. The Charter came into force on October 21, 1986 after ratification by a simple majority
of African states in accordance with Art.63(3). The Charter's swift entry into force was not
anticipated by all. See Olusola Ojo & Amadu Sesay, The O.A. U and Human Rights: Prospects
for the 1980s and Beyond, 8 HuM. RTS. Q. 89, 101 (1986) ("[I]t is doubtful whether the Charter
will ever come into force in the 1980s...").
332. The mechanisms contained in Chapter III of the Banjul Charter are weak because of
political control and oversight, and bureaucratic overbearance. There are also insufficient funds
to effectively implement some of the procedures mandated, such as on-site investigations. See
Emmanuel Bello, The Mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, I AFR.
J. INT'L L. 31 (1988).
333. Such a fact can be discerned from the absence of any communication on the issue until
March, 1995. See International Commission of Jurists, Lomg Workshop Debates Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Impunity and Prisons (Undated news release, on file with the author)
[hereinafter Lomi Workshop Debates].
334. 0. Umozorike The protection of human rights under the Banjul (African) Charter on
Human and People's Rights, 1 AFR. J. INT'L. L. 65, 81 (1988).
335. Id.
336. See Banjul Charter, supra note 39, arts. 47-59.
337. See Nana Busia & Bibiane G. Mbaye, Towards a Framework for Filing Communica-
tions about Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the African Charter, 3 E. AFR. J. PEACE
& HUM. RTS. (forthcoming 1996). Article 45 mandates the Commission established under the
Charter to "[e]nsure the protection of the human and peoples' rights under conditions laid down
by the present Charter," and Article 55 allows communications from entities or persons other
than states parties. Banjul Charter, supra note 39, arts. 45 & 55.
338. See The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Work of the African
Commission of Human & Peoples Rights (ACPHR): A Compilation of Basic Documents (Oct.
1991 - Apr. 1994) (Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, Geneva) 1994 [hereinafter ICJ Compilation].
[Vol. 26
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issues such as the right to a fair trial and freedom of association. 339
However, in performing the functions stipulated under Article 45(1)(b) of the
Charter, 3 ° there has been no attempt to marry the focus on civil and
political rights to the progressive achievement and realization of economic
and social rights. 34' For example, the resolution on fair trial could
conceivably have been extended to cover the status and rights of indigent
defendants, public-aided legal assistance, or the critical issue of "popular"justice. 34 2
With respect to the issue of associational rights, the Commission could
have taken the opportunity to make observations on trade union rights, as
well as on rights linked to such activity, in much the same way as the
Committee on Economic and Social Rights does on a regular basis .34  The
Commission has also failed in its general commentary, to make any mention
of issues such as poverty, development or SAPs-all of them matters that are
central to the broad struggle for human rights in Africa today. 31 With the
recent application of political conditionality to the extension of development
finance, the Commission could have played a role in seeking a more
comprehensive and relevant interpretation of the notion than the negative
conditionality that has hitherto been applied. 345
While the substantive content of the Banjul Charter came up far short of
the pledge it makes in the Preamble, the guidelines for the submission of
states parties' periodic reports drafted in 1988 provide a wider framework for
the implementation of those unfulfilled aspirations. 3' The guidelines
devote considerably more attention to economic and social rights than they
339. See ICJ Compilation supra note 338. Wolfgang Benedek, The African Charter and
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: How to make it more effective, 11 NETH. Q. HUM.
RTs. 25, 26 (1993).
340. This provision stipulates that the Commission will formulate and lay down rules aimed
at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples rights, as a basis for the construction of
domestic legislation by governments.
341. Dissatisfaction with the performance of the Commission with respect to economic and
social rights, led the most recent Workshop of African Human Rights NGOs meeting in March
1995, to call upon the Commission to take up the issue in a serious fashion. See Lomd Workshop
Debates, supra note 333.
342. See J. Oloka-Onyango, 'Popular Justice', Resistance Committee Courts and the Judicial
Process in Uganda, 1988-92, 3 BEYOND LAW: MAS ALLA DEL DERECHO, July 1993, at 39.
343. See, e.g., Human Rights Questions: International Covenants on Human Rights, Report
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its Third Session, U.N. ESCOR,
Ist Reg. Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 9(a), paras. 170-87, U.N. Doc. E/1989/L.9 (1989).
344. See ICJ Compilation, supra note 338, especially Part II.
345. See Benedek, supra note 339, at 36.
346. See Promotion, Protection and Restoration of Human and Peoples' Rights, Guidelines
for National Periodic Reports, African Commission Human and Peoples' Rights, 4th Sess.,
ACHPR Doc. AFR/COM/HRP.5 (IV) (1988) [hereinafter African Commission Guidelines]. See
also Claude E. Welch, Jr., The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Five-year
Report and Assessment, 14 HuM. RTS. Q. 43, 53 (1993).
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do to civil and political rights.347 Only three pages are devoted to the
latter, while those on the former extend to eighteen a48 Furthermore, while
the Charter is silent on a number of rights, the guidelines require reporting
on, inter alia, equal opportunity for promotion, 349 rest, leisure and holiday
with pay, 35° the free operation of trade unions35I and the right to
strike. 352  A basis thus exists for much more vigorous action on economic
and social rights by the Commission than is laid out in the Charter. Some
tentative steps would have to be taken to remedy the general inertia in this
area, however. The African Commission could begin by initiating a process
of imaginative translation of the bare rights in the Charter into appropriate
frameworks for implementation.353
The Commission can begin to approach this issue by borrowing
approaches to the issue developed by both its regional counterparts-the Inter
American Commission35 4 and Court355 on Human Rights and the Europe-
an Union system356-and translating those approaches in the context of
existent conditions on the continent. While neither of the two have devoted
as extensive attention to economic and social rights as they have to civil and
political rights, a look at what they have done in the area would be instruc-
tive. In Europe, the adoption of the European Social Charter 37 in 1961
as the counterpart to the ICESCR, never led to any significant action
primarily because of a lack of political will. 358 Nonetheless, recent efforts
at the resuscitation of the Charter and the establishment of an enforcement
mechanism have led to the formation of an expert group to seriously examine
the issue, and should provide some guidelines for the Commission in
formulating an appropriate approach to the issue.359  Moreover, the
347. African Commission Guidelines, supra note 346.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 10.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 11.
352. Id. at 12. A comparison between the African Commission Guidelines and those of the
ICESCR Committee would be useful, particularly given the extensive experience of the latter.
Of course, this is not to say that the Committee's guidelines are free from problems. See Jabine
& Johnston, supra note 69, at 17-18.
353. See Busia & Mbaye, supra note 337.
354. Established under The American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts.
34-51, 79, 80, OAS T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into force, July 18, 1978)
[hereinafter American Convention].
355. Established under id. ch. VIII, arts. 52-73, 81-82.
356. On the European Union System, see supra note 32. The European Commission on
Human Rights was established under the European Convention, supra note 32, art. 19.1 and
governed by arts. 20-37. The European Court of Human Rights was established under art. 19.2,
and governed (until the adoption of Protocol 11) by arts. 38-56 of the same Convention.
357. European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, Europ. T.S. No. 35 (entered
into force, Feb. 26, 1965).
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European Commission has come closest to considering the issue of whether
"inhuman and degrading treatment" can be applied to socioeconomic
conditions."
A number of interesting developments have taken place within the Inter-
American system too. 361  First, an Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (the Protocol of San Salvador) was promulgated in 1988.362 In
contrast to the ICESCR it contains a petition mechanism on the right to
education and on trade union rights .363 Although the Protocol of San
Salvador is yet to come into force, the IACHR has recommended the
adoption of local legislation based on it. 31 In addition, the Inter-American
Court has considered the effect that the provisions requiring the equivalent
of "exhaustion of local remedies" would have on an indigent person, and
whether such requirement could be waived.365 Advisory Opinion OC-
11/90 of the Court ruled that indigent persons do not have to exhaust legal
domestic remedies if they can demonstrate that their economic condition
prevents them from obtaining legal counsel. 36 While the other regions of
the world are still in the process of developing a more concise application of
economic and social rights, there is still much to be gleaned from the
360. See Antonio Cassese, Can the Notion of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment be Applied
to Socio-Economic Conditions?, 2(2) EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 141 (1991).
361. In 1980, for example, the IACHR stated:
The general and well-founded belief is that in some countries, the extreme poverty of
the masses-the result in part of less-equitable distribution of the resources of produc-
tion-has been the fundamental cause of the terror that afflicted and continues to
afflict those countries .... The essence of the legal obligation incurred by any
government in this area is to attain the economic and social aspirations of its people,
by following an order that assigns priority to the basic needs of health, nutrition and
education.
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1979-80, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/VII.50, at 151-52, quoted in Eide, supra note 20, at 42.
362. Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, reprinted in 28 ILM 161 (1989).
363. Id. art. 19.6.
364. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1993, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.LfVII.85/Doc.9/Rev., at 519-39 (1994).
365. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-I 1/90 of August 10,
1990, para. 22 stated,
If a person who seeking the protection of the law in order to assert rights which the
Convention guarantees finds that his economic status (in this case, his indigency)
prevents him from so doing because he cannot afford either the necessary legal
counsel or the costs of the proceedings, that person is being discriminated against by
reason of his economic status and, hence, is not receiving equal protection before the
law.
Reprinted in 12 HuM. RTS. L.J. 20 (1991).
366. Id. paras. 30-31.
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formulations in the establishing instruments, as well as the modes of
implementation that have been adopted.
The failure of the African Commission to articulate economic and social
rights in a more aggressive fashion is clearly an expression of a political
problem, which only gains magnitude in light of the acute nature of the
economic and social crisis faced by African states today. The inclusion of
new rights in the Banjul Charter was instrumental in the struggle to elevate
them to the international arena,367 and boosted attention to economic and
social rights globally.36 Unfortunately, the performance of African states
and of the Commission in the progressive development and realization of
these rights has not been exemplary. At the same time, African human rights
organizations have only recently woken to the necessity to deploy the
mechanisms of the Banjul Charter to productive domestic use.369 The
establishment of the NGO Forum to meet at the same time as the bi-annual
Commission sessions,3 70 was an extremely innovative idea, and can be
credited with many of the reforms introduced by the Commission.37' At
the same time, the pressure on the Commission tapers off immediately after
the sessions have ended. Imaginative strategies for the activation of the
Commission demonstrate that the success of the mechanism depends as much
on popular forces and activists as it does on the members of the body.372
C. The Lagos Plan and the AAF-SAP
At the beginning of the 1980s, African heads of state and government
came together to consider the approach of the OAU to the issue of social
and economic development.3 73 From these deliberations emerged the Lagos
Plan of Action (LPA), aimed at the self-reliance of African countries, self-
367. See, e.g., Lynn Berat, Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a Crime
of Geocide in International Law, 11 B.U. INT'L L. J. 327, 346 (1993).
368. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 20, at 255-58.
369. See J. Oloka-Onyango, Human Rights Activism in Africa: A Frog's Eye View, COD.
BULL. (1995).
370. A forum convening human rights NGOs from all over Africa was established to meet
before each session of the bi-annual Commission meetings. The International Commission of
Jurists (ICJ) is instrumental in bringing the groups together. The Forum is often attended by
Commissioners, who are queried about particular issues relating to the operations of the
Commission, and other related matters. The recommendations of the Forum are then transmitted
to the Commission for deliberation and debate. See ICJ Compilation, supra note 338.
371. The NGO Forum was instrumental not only in achieving the appointment of the first
woman commissioner to the body, but also in relaxing the application of the rules on
confidentiality and paving the way for the African Commission's public denouncement of specific
practices that could violate human rights (such as military coups d'etat), and regimes that
assumed power through extra-constitutional means (e.g. Nigeria, Rwanda and Gambia).
372. In this respect, the strategies employed by the Nigerian Constitutional Rights Project
(CRP) are extremely instructive in attempting to get the African Charter to function positively
in the domestic context. See Case Comment, Does Municipal Law Prevail over International
Human Rights Law in Africa?, 2 E. AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 102 (1995).
373. Foreword by Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Africa,
to AAF-SAP, supra note 292.
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sustaining development and economic growth. 374 The LPA noted that of
the thirty-one countries designated by the United Nations as least developed
(LDCs), twenty of them came from Africa. 375  There was thus a need to
reverse this situation.376 The Plan was intended to promote the develop-
ment of the nations and peoples of Africa and their progressive integration
over greater regional areas and to set up an African Economic Community
by the end of the century .3' The Plan comprised five action areas: (1)
environment, (2) the LDCs, (3) energy, (4) women and (5) planning,
statistics and population.
The LPA was heavily biased towards macro-economic factors, and
reflected a continuing passion for the large infrastructural projects that had
been the typical emphasis of development planning in the early years of
independence.378 One notable exception was the focus on women379
-presaging the attention that followed the Nairobi Conference3" and the
Women in Development schema of the donor agencies .381 The LPA
recognized the fact that traditional discriminatory practices were inhibiting
the involvement of a significant section of the population, as well as being
counterproductive to the development process. Parpart compared the
Plan to another simultaneously issued by the World Bank,3 83 and found that
the latter was woefully inferior in considering the interests of women.3
According to her, the LPA also spurred "heartening improvements" for
women in Africa.3 5
By including women as a specific point of focus, the LPA represented
the first tentative forays away from state-centered to people-based foci in the
field of African policy formulation. The bridge was eventually crossed with
374. LPA, supra note 40.
375. Id. pmbl. para. 6.
376. Id. pmbl. para 11.
377. Id. pmbl.
378. For a broad critique of the LPA, see Frederick W. Jjuuko, The State, Democracy and
Constitutionalism in Africa, 2 E. AFR. J. OF PEACE & HUM. RTS. 1, 3-4 (1995).
379. LPA, supra note 40, ch. XII.
380. See Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the
United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, July 15-26, 1985, The
Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 116/28/Rev. 1 (1985).
381. See, e.g., J. Oloka-Onyango & Sylvia Tamale, "The Personal is Political," or Why
Women's Rights are Indeed Human Rights: An African Perspective on International Feminism,
17 HuM. RTS. Q. 691 (1995).
382. LPA, supra note 40, ch. xii.
383. WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN AGENDA
FOR ACTION (1981).
384. See Jane L. Parpart, Women's Rights and the Lagos Plan of Action, 8 HuM. RTS. Q.
180, 190-91 (1986).
385. Id. at 192. These improvements include recognition of women as important actors in
the development paradigm.
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the Khartoum Conference on the Human Dimension of Africa's Economic
Recovery and Development, in 1988 which witnessed a concerted effort to
shift the focus from the state to the people.386 The apex of this movement
was the AAF-SAP in 1989,387 which was a direct critique of the debilitat-
ing IMF policies that had operated in Africa since the early 1980s.31 The
critique argued that these programs had frustrated both the African peoples
upon whom they had been imposed, as well as the institutions that had
designed them. 389 Even though they had began to respond to such failure
and frustration, the response was slow and evasive. 39  The critique went
on to state, "Most proposals seem to stick to the core of the old types of
SAPs and to merely add some aspects of a human face." 39 1  It then
proceeded to give a point-by-point appraisal and recommendation of what
should be done.3" To date, the main recommendations of the AAF-SAP
remain largely valid, 393 but the movement by IFDIs on the issue has been
slow. 39  The preference remains for the SAPs applied in the 1980s,
ameliorated through poverty-alleviation programs which target the most "vul-
386. THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF AFRICA'S PERSISTENT ECONOMIC CRISIS (Adebayo Adedeji
et al. eds., 1990).
387. See supra note 292.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 24.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 24-25.
392. Id.
393. The AAF-SAP recommendations in terms of major policy directions included the
following:
a) enhanced production and efficient resource use;
b) greater and more efficient domestic resource mobilization;
c) improving human resources capacity;
d) strengthening scientific and technological base, and
e) vertical and horizontal diversification.
See AAF-SAP, supra note 292, at 33-34. With regard to factor income allocation, the following
were the recommendations:
a) establish a pragmatic balance between the public and private sectors;
b) create an enabling environment for sustainable development;
c) shift resources from non-productive and military expenditure, and
d) improve the pattern of income-distribution among different categories of household.
Id. at 35. Satisfying required needs would thus entail:
a) food self-sufficiency;
b) lessened import-dependence;
c) re-alignment of consumption patterns with production patterns, and
d) managing debt and debt-servicing.
Id at 36.
394. See Nnoli, supra note 142.
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nerable" members of society.3 95 Even these have had questionable results,
however.3 96 Seeing that SAPs are the most debilitating economic reform
policies currently in place in Africa, IFDIs would do well to accord more
attention to the critique.
At the annual Summit meeting of OAU Heads of state and government
in Abuja in 1991, the OAU adopted the treaty establishing the African
Economic Community (AEC) thus achieving the pinnacle of the Lagos
Plan.3" The key elements in the treaty are spelled out in Article 4, and
include, inter alia, the promotion of economic, social and cultural develop-
ment and the integration of African economies in order to increase economic
self-reliance and indigenous and self-sustaining development.3 98 However,
as Muna Ndulo has observed, it is clear that African heads of state remain
addicted to the notion of state sovereignty, and are also unlikely to actively
foster some of the key elements in the treaty, such as those concerning the
free movement of peoples. 399 Moreover, even though the AEC Treaty
establishes an African Court of Justice,' Chris Peter points out that the
deficiencies in the Court's enabling statute do not make for an optimistic
reading of the institution."
Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum-the people's corner-signi-
ficant developments have been taking place in the bid by individuals and
communities to seize the initiative and transform the debate over economic
and social questions on the continent. 42 The most prominent of these was
the unanimous adoption of the African Charter for Popular Participation in
Development and Transformation (Charter for Popular Participation), 3
395. See supra text accompanying notes 114-65.
396. Id.
397. OAU, Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, adopted at Abuja,
Nigeria, on June 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241 (1991) [hereinafter AEC Treaty].
398. Id. art. 4.
399. See Ndulo, supra note 35, at 106.
400. See AEC Treaty, supra note 397, arts. 7(l)(e) & 18.
401. Chris Mana Peter, The Proposed African Court of Justice: Jurisprudential, Procedural,
Enforcement Problems and Beyond, I E. AFR. J. OF PEACE & HUM. RTs. 117, 119-21 (1993).
Among the deficiencies in the African Court are the manner of appointment of the judges, the
extent of political control over and the location of the Court. Id. at 131-34. The appointment
of the Court vests in the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Id. at 131. Therefore,
the independence of the judges can be undermined by political interference. Id. The seat of the
court could present a problem in relation to the political conditions that may arise in the
designated country, as happened with the OAU headquarters, which was forced to evacuate Addis
Ababa on account of the civil war in Ethiopia in the early 1990s. Id.
402. See Celia R. Taylor, The Right of Participation in Development Projects, 13
DICKINSON J. INT'L L. 69, 70 (1994).
403. The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation,
E.C.A. Res 691 (XXV), UN. Econ. Comm'n for Africa, 25th Sess., 267th mtg. (1990),
reproduced in, Note Verbal to the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Prov. Agenda
Items 12 & 18, app. I, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/45/427 (1990) [hereinafter Charter for Popular
Participation].
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which stemmed from a frustration with the failure of traditional development
paradigms to appreciate the role of "popular participation."' Consequent-
ly, the Charter for Popular Participation called for the encouragement of
increased participation by governments, community groups, individuals and
the international sector in the design and evaluation of development
projects .' The extent to which the Charter for Popular Participation will
actually affect the operations of these groups remains to be examined.
Finally, however, the continental movement on the issue of socioeco-
nomic development has been sporadic, and uninspiring .1 6  The high-
sounding promises of the LPA and AAF-SAP and more popular participation
have been drowned in the battle-cries of warlords in countries like Somalia
and Liberia. 7  As internal friction and conflict has caused the OAU to
turn its attention all the more to issues concerning security, displacement and
conflict resolution, 48 economic and social rights have been relegated even
further down the scale.' 9 Paradoxically, all this is occurring against the
backdrop of a terrifying social and economic crisis that has placed most
African countries on the brink of bankruptcy and holds them in continuing
and ever more extensive ransom to the dictates of the IMF and the World
Bank.41° In such a situation, it becomes imperative to consider how
proactive measures can be pursued in order to reduce, and eventually
eliminate these problems. Such preventive action must include not only a
greater emphasis on internal democratic structures, but on the economic and
social frameworks on which these are constructed. For a consideration of
some of the ways to approach these issues, we turn, by way of conclusion,
to the domestic context.
III. BACK TO BASICS: THE IMPERATIVES OF DOMESTIC ACTION
Despite the fairly progressive developments in the realization and
protection of human rights at the international level and the existence of an
evolving framework on the regional front, the essential point of such activity
must be to influence and transform the domestic context. In the words of
Theo van Boven, international procedures,
404. Taylor, supra note 402, at 98.
405. Charter for Popular Participation, supra note 403, pt. III, para. 23.
406. On overall socioeconomic conditions in Africa, see HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT:
1994, supra note 178.
407. See generally Jeffrey Herbst, Challenges to Africa's Boundaries in the New World
Order, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 17 (1992).
408. Recognizing this trend, in 1993 the OAU established a new mechanism for conflict
resolution, See Resolving Conflicts in Africa. Implementation Options, INFORMATION SERVICES
PUBLICATION-SERIES (II) (OAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) 1993.
409. See supra text accompanying notes 166-212 (on aid), and 114-65 (on SAPs).
410. See supra text accompanying notes 114-65.
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can never be considered as substitutes for national mechanisms and national
measures with the aim to give effect to human rights standards. Human
rights have to be implemented first and foremost at national and local
levels. The primary responsibility of States to realize human rights is vis-
a-vis the people who live under the jurisdiction of these States."1 '
How is this to be done? The vast disparity and number of African countries
and the sheer complexity of a host of domestic variables preclude a
microscopic scrutiny and analysis of country situations in a study of this size.
Such an exercise must nevertheless be carried out, not only to bring the
international and regional dimensions to bear within the domestic context, but
also for a more complete appreciation of the possibilities and of the
limitations presented by the individual struggles to reinvigorate attention to
economic and social rights.412 This part of the paper confines itself to an
overview of the most critical issues involved in that struggle.
Top on the list are the process of democratization and the intricacies of
constitutional reform, or to employ Albie Sach's eloquent phrase, the "right
to be nave." 413 Following in close succession are the related questions of
popular participation and extra-governmental activism within the context of
a "structurally-adjusting" framework. Such an examination must consider
the need for the rearticulation of standards and mechanisms for the
progressive enforcement of economic and social rights in the African
context. 14 This must be done by looking at the dynamic link between
international political economy and domestic structures which exclude and
dominate people.4t 5 It must also extend the parameters of participation
beyond local and regional boundaries. In the process, it must confront
411. Theo van Boven, The International System of Human Rights: An Overview, in MANUAL
ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING, supra note 54 at 10.
412. Alston points out that it is essential to remember the genuine differences between the
two categories of rights, and consequently the "different benchmarks" that would be established
for individual countries. See Alston, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, supra note 66, at 37. While this
is a valid point, at the same time, it is essential not to lose sight of the structural and other
conditions that enhance those differences, and thus force the adoption of lower benchmarks. In
sum, the element of global redistribution and obligation must be kept in sight.
413. By the "right to be naive" Sachs means an idealistic view of justice and righteousness,
as opposed to a "pragmatic" one which is primarily concerned with the actual possibilities of
enforcing a human right. Sachs states: "it is one of our major tasks to hold that essential faith
in justice and rightness, to believe that even these poor international documents [the Covenants]
might help us transform our world." Sachs employs the phrase in the Harvard debate on the
Right to Health by way of buttressing his argument for the need to approach economic and social
issues within a rights framework. See Albie Sachs in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, supra note 66, at
42.
414. The basic tenets are contained in the Covenants, and the various elaborations in other
international instruments. Hence the starting point should be the issues of self-determination,
non-discrimination and equality. Additionally, there is the need to review and consider the
applicability of the Limburg Principles, supra note 107.
415. See Susan George, The Structure of Dominance in the International Geo-Economic
System and the Prospects for Human Rights Realization, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERSPECTIVE: A
GLOBAL ASSESSMENT 268 (Asbjorn Eide & Bernt Hagtvet, eds., 1988).
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traditional orthodoxies about sovereignty, self-determination, the accountabil-
ity of international actors, and the obligations of truly popular and partici-
patory government.
A. Reconsidering the Structural and Normative Framework:
or the 'Right to be Nai've'
As Africa approaches the end of the twentieth century, a number of
factors relevant to a consideration of the domestic context in which human
rights are to be realized are immediately manifest. These can be examined
at two levels-the macro- and microscopic-although the demarcation
between the two is by no means so succinct. At the macro level, the most
apparent factor is the process of democratic reform, ignited in many
countries by the tremors of the late-1980s and continuing to find expression
on a variety of different fronts, from contexts like Nigeria and Algeria, to
less volatile situations such as Benin and Malawi." 6 A lesson common to
all is that without a strategy that combines both the aspirations for political
liberation with the imperatives of economic sustenance and empowerment,
any gains will quickly disintegrate.4"7 Put another way, the exercise of the
right to vote is no guarantee of freedom from want or hunger.4"8
Central to this process must be the reconceptualization of state power,
even as the eruptions in Somalia and Liberia test the very notion of the post-
colonial African state.4n 9 The fact is that whether by omission or commis-
sion, the state still has a significant role to play in African politics and soci-
ety. Consequently, the first objective of the struggle must be to positively
influence the processes of constitutional reform already underway in a variety
of different countries; here finding expression as the Confrrences Nacional
(CNs); z° there as a Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC),42 else-
416. On the current situation in Nigeria, Algeria, Malawi and Benin, see Iyiola, supra note
311, at 14-15 (on Nigeria); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1995, 256-61 (1994) (on
Algeria); van Donghe, supra note 273, at 254 (on Malawi); Nwajiaku, supra note 27 (on Benin).
417. It is clear, for example, that for impoverished people, the act of voting is only a
temporary balm for hunger, as is the right to free expression and participation, if the cost of a
newspaper is beyond affordability.
418. Zehra Arat points out that,
Elected governments do not hesitate to employ government sanctions in the face of
persistent social unrest, and such actions not only reduce the level of democraticness
[sic] in the country but also pave the way for further coercion and military interven-
tion. In fact such sanctions can justify and legitimize subsequent military takeovers.
For example, in many countries that experience high levels of social unrest, we see
martial law put into effect by civilian governments.
See ZEHRA F. ARAT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 104 (1991).
419. For a consideration of the present state of the state in Africa, see Julius Ihonvbere, The
'irrelevant' State, Ethnicity and the Quest for Nationhood in Africa, 17 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD.
42 (1994).
420. Cf Nwaijaku, supra note 27.
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where, in the activities of non-governmental actors.4a If the promise of
post-independence constitutionalism was lost on the rocks of demagoguery
and "imperial presidentialism,"42 3 then the second wave should not be
similarly undermined by the failure to incorporate economic and social rights
into constitutional frameworks in a comprehensive and dynamic fashion.424
While a democratic and progressive Constitution is not the linchpin to
greater human rights observation, the absence of one clearly does not
enhance it.42 Scott and Macklen provide the most articulate reasoning for
the need to begin with the Constitution,
Whereas the constitutionalization of social rights would be a recognition of
the fact that adequate nutrition, housing, health, and education are critical
components of social existence, the exclusion of social rights from a South
African constitution necessarily would result in the suppression of certain
societal voices. Perhaps the strongest reason for including a certain
number of economic and social rights is that by constitutionalizing half of
the human rights equation, South Africans would be constitutionalizing only
part of what it is to be a full person. A constitution containing only civil
and political rights projects an image of truncated humanity. Symbolically,
421. On CRCs, Uganda provides the best example. See Museveni's Uganda, supra note
133.
422. The most interesting example of nongovernmental action with respect to the constitu-
tional debate comes from Kenya, where a number of groups have come together to draft a
"model" constitution and place it in the public domain for debate. See The Kenya We Want:
Proposals for a Model Constitution, SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS (Law Society of Kenya, Kenya
Human Rights Commission, and the International Commission of Jurists (Kenya Section)) 1994.
Needless to say, the Moi government has not been amused by such antics.
423. On the causes of the collapse of post-independence constitutionalism, see STATE AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM: AN AFRICAN DEBATE ON DEMOCRACY (Issa G. Shivji, ed., 1991).
424. A look at two instruments in this struggle will illustrate the point. The draft Uganda
Constitution (1993) contains provisions on women, the disabled and children, but summarizes
economic rights in one article, which states: "Article 67(1) Every person has right to work under
satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work without
discrimination; (2) Every worker shall be accorded rest, and reasonable working hours and
periods of holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays." See Draft
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, (Uganda Constitutional Commission, Kampala, Uganda).
The interim South African Constitution according to Steenkamp is "heavily biased towards
traditional, liberal, civil and political rights," which was "probably the result of objections to the
inclusion of second generation rights from the government negotiators." Steenkamp, supra note
29, at 106. See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1994), reprinted in [1995 Binder
XVIII] Constitutions of the Countries of the World, (Oceana Pub. Inc.) (Gisbert H. Flanz ed.,
1995) [hereinafter South African Const.] See also CACHALIA ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN
THE NEW CONSTITUTION 19-126 (1994). Of the 28 articles in the Constitution, only 6 refer to
economic, social and cultural rights, while the rest are concerned with the traditional civil and
political rights. These six are Articles 26 on economic activity; 27, on labour relations; 28 on
property; 29 on environment; 31 on language and culture, and 32 on education. South African
Const., supra.
425. See Craig Scott & Patrick Macklen, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable
Guarantees?: Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 28-29
(1992) (citations omitted).
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but still brutally, it excludes those segments of society for whom autonomy
means little without the necessities of life.426
The process of extrapolating economic and social rights and constitution-
alizing them is nevertheless a struggle of political negotiation, tempered by
the realities of individual country situations, rather than of the wholesale
adoption of rigid international principles. The scale, number and content of
economic and social rights can be the subject of contestation; the fact of their
inclusion should not.427 The stronger elements of the Banjul Charter, such
as those contained in Articles 25 and 28, can form the basis for articulating
a firm state duty to eliminate discrimination and to protect disadvantaged
social and political minorities. a2 In addition, however, there is a need to
develop new instrumentalities for the control of governmental excess, and to
protect the essential parameters of a decent human existence.429 In this
respect, the need to cultivate a receptive and dynamic Judiciary becomes
paramount. 4a0  Elaborating on matters of tenure, autonomy and protection
within the Constitution would contribute to the achievement of this objective
by establishing a precise framework of rights and obligations, and a
foundation upon which a basis for the equal treatment with respect to
property rights can be formulated.43' Simultaneously, more attention
should be paid to the potential for the development of alternative methods of
economic and social empowerment, methods that lessen the burden of the
state, while assuring that human rights standards are not undermined.432
At the microscopic level, the constitutional framework can also begin to
address the question of priorities. This would provide a constitutional basis
426. Id. at 28-29.
427. Cf Herman Schwartz, Economic and Social Rights, 8 AM. U. INT'L L. & POL'Y 551
(1993).
428. Article 28, as Butegwa, supra note 319 points out, is a basis for action, although there
are a number of contradictions among the articles of the Charter. These contradictions include
reference in the otherwise progressive Article 18 to "tradition" and the "family" both of which
can serve to undermine the realization of women's human rights. Id at 501-03.
429. See THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, supra note 66, at 43.
430. An enduring problem, particularly in Anglophone Africa is the conservatism of judges.
This has not, however, stopped a few from issuing maverick and enlightened judgments with
respect to human rights. Thus in the unreported Tanzanian case of Masatu v. Mwanza Textiles
(Civil Case No. 3 of 1986, High Court at Mwanza), the judge upheld a "right to work," even
before the Tanzanian Bill of Rights had become justiciable! See Issa Shivji, Contradictory
Developments in the Teaching and Practice of Human Rights Law in Tanzania, 35 J. AFR. L.
116, 121-22 n.25 (1991).
431. For an examination of the various issues relating to the creation of an independent
Judiciary in an anglophone African context, see Oloka-Onyango, supra note 328.
432. One such method is through the development of courts practicing popular justice. See
JOHN-JEAN BARYA & J. OLOKA-ONYANGO, POPULAR JUSTICE AND RESISTANCE COMMITrEE
COURTS IN UGANDA (1994). Francis Regan considers this issue in relation to the Ugandan
context and contests the need to focus on traditional legal aid when there are a variety of
different methods that should be attempted, both for the greater involvement of the people as well
as for the economies involved. See Francis Regan, Legal Resources in Uganda, 22 INT'L J. Soc.
L. 203 (1994). He argues that such a view of legal resources would greatly enhance the way in
which we consider human development in the terms defined by the UNDP. Id. at 204-206.
[Vol. 26
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from which to monitor the debt. It would also allow the doctrine of
"noxious" or "odious" debts to be applied more vigorously when state
resources are expended on the purchase of arms or other non-essential
goods.433 Patricia Adams has spoken of the need for a constitutional
balanced budget provision which would bring the issue of prioritization
within the context of a constitutionally adjudicatory process. Critical to
such an endeavor would be the localization of SAPs, which are currently
carried out beyond the pale of domestic action, participation or control.435
Consequently the practice of writing budgets at World Bank headquarters
(and imposing unreasonable conditions and unjustifiable social sacrifices) can
be challenged from a constitutional foundation.436 In the context of large
populations of illiterate and marginalized people however, and the continuing
influence of Elysde and Westminster systems of government, such a
provision would need to be buttressed with local grassroots frameworks.437
To do so entails not simply the decentralization of state power, but the corre-
sponding destruction of local autocracy-often epitomized in the successor
to the colonial chief.438  In this way, the debate on economic policy
becomes as much an issue of national concern, as it is a question of local
involvement and action.
The few examples given above illustrate the macro- and microscopic
levels at which action in the area of economic and social rights is necessary.
433. See Juliette Majot, The Doctrine of Odious Debts, in FIFTY YEARS iS ENOUGH: THE
CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 35 (Kevin
Danaher ed., 1994). Patricia Adams defines "noxious" or "odious" debts as, "Any debt that has
been incurred by a government without the informed consent of its people, and one that is not
used in the legitimate interest of the State." Id. (interview of Patricia Adams). See also Ginther
Frankenburg & Rolf Knieper, Legal Problems of the Overindebtedness of Developing Countries:
The Current Relevance of the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 12 INT'L J. SOC. L. 415 (1984).
434. Patricia Adams, The World Bank and the IMF in Sub-saharan Africa: Undermining
Development and Environmental Sustainability, 46 J. INT'L AFFS. 97, 117 (1992).
435. Supra text accompanying notes 114-65.
436. Id.
437. The following figures illustrate the extent of illiteracy and marginalization in Africa:
I. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) net enrollment in primary schools is 55% for boys
and 46% for girls. In the Industrialized Countries (ICs) net primary enrollment is
96% for boys and 97% for girls.
2. In SSA, net secondary enrollment (above grade 5 of primary school) is 22% for
boys and 14% for girls, while in the ICs it is 91% and 92% respectively.
3. For every 1,000 people in SSA, there are 143 radios. In the ICs, there are 1,144
per 1,000.
4. For every 1,000 people in SSA, there are only 23 televisions. In the ICs, there are
551 per 1,000.
UNICEF, supra note 76, at 84, tbl. 10.
438. Such decentralization would be achieved, by, to cite a few examples, creating village
committees to adjudicate simple disputes, removing the power to arbitrarily impose fines and
other punishments, and making the post of chief elective rather than by administrative or political
appointment. See also Oloka-Onyango, supra note 328.
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But it is at the local level-the level of extra-governmental activity-that the
struggle to effect a progressive policy for the realization of these rights
should primarily focus.
B. The Local is Global: Linking Participation, Cooperation and Activism
If among international NGOs the notion of economic and social rights
has only recently been adopted as a focus of action (and even then in
sporadic fashion), the African context is even less encouraging. 4 9 Despite
operating within a context of severe social and economic strife and tur-
moil," the vast majority of local groups are involved in traditional human
rights work. 44' At the other end of the spectrum, there is an equally great
number of groups involved in development and humanitarian work."42
Unfortunately, the twain rarely meet. Only recently, to cite one example
from Uganda, have groups working in support of people with AIDS begun
to liaise with groups working on legal and human rights." 3 At a continen-
tal level, only the women's human rights movement has developed a cogent
and holistic approach to the concatenation of the two categories of rights by,
for example, linking the struggle for land rights to the political framework,
and the structure of the family to the related socioeconomic issues that
pervade such questions.' Similarly, at the regional level, womens'
groups operate more closely than do groups working in the broader human
rights field." 5  Such 'networking' has greatly boosted the strategic and
conceptual development of the movement on the continent.'
It is also essential to consider a vast array of different mechanisms that
can be established (and supported at minimal cost) to both decentralize and
popularize the exercise of political power. Institutions ranging from
439. Only the groups in South Africa, among them Black Sash, the Community Law Centre(CLC), Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), and the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) devote
attention to economic and social rights.
440. Status Report, supra note 22, at 5.
441. Among the most prominent human rights groups are the Legal Resources Centre (LRC)
in Zimbabwe, the Constitutional Rights Project (CRP) in Nigeria, and the Sudan Human Rights
Organization.
442. Development and humanitarian groups include the external actors like Oxfam and Save
the Children's Fund (SCF), and ActionAid, while indigenous organizations include a variety of
groups spread throughout the continent.
443. See J. Oloka-Onyango, The HIV/AIDS Crisis, Human Rights and Legal Aid in Uganda,
LAP NEWS (Nov. 1993). The Legal Aid Project (LAP), in Uganda, for example, recently
commenced a collaborative program of counseling and legal advice with the Aids Support
Organization (TASO).
444. See Adetoun Ilumoka, African Women's Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights-Toward a Relevant Theory and Practice, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 32,
at 307-325.
445. See Status Report, supra note 22, at 5. Women's groups that work in close tandem
include, Women In Law and Development in Africa, FIDA (Federation of Women Lawyers), and
Women and the Law in Southern Africa (WLSA).
446. See STATUS REPORT, supra note 22.
[Vol. 26
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Socioeconomic Commissions 7 to Ombudspersons,"8 would help in the
realization of such an objective. Such institutions would be critical, for
example, in adjudicating grievances about health care and medical services.
They could oversee the situation in relation to access to education, and be
deployed to overcome general administrative vice. The same is true for the
issue of corruption which left in the hands of government, is akin to charging
the monkey with responsibility for burning down the forest."49  However
to the extent possible, there should be a shift away from government. Rather
than relying solely on a government agency to track the issue of equality in
education, this function could also be executed by an NGO involved in issues
of non-discrimination. The compilation of socioeconomic indices and
statistical data for each area of activity in which an NGO is involved (from
prisons to children to refugees etc.) should become standard practice for all
NGOs.
Human rights groups should join with groups working in development
to track real incomes and measure the effectiveness of World Bank/IMF
social "safety nets" and poverty-adjustment schemes. This would form part
of the process of monitoring the impact of SAPs on economic and social
rights, particularly access to health, education and social services. Given the
premium placed on privatization and de-indegenization, NGOs need to
evaluate what impact this process is having on access to shelter, property
rights and rights of non-discrimination. Much more should be done to
encourage the erection of individual Economic and Social Rights Chapters,
as Albie Sachs suggests, in trade unions, schools and other public and private
institutions simply to monitor the impact of SAPs on the people's daily
lives." More specialized groups devoted to the compilation of timely,
multi-disciplinary and relevant data, need to address themselves to the
implications of their work on social and economic rights.45'
447. See Mario Gomez,- Socioeconomic Rights and Human Rights Commissions, 17 HUM.
RTs. Q. 155, 162-68 (1995).
448. In this respect, the operations of Uganda's equivalent to an Ombudsperson provides an
interesting study in the tackling of economic and social rights. See J. Oloka-Onyango, The
Dynamics of Corruption Control and Human Rights Enforcement in Uganda: The Case of the
Inspector General of Government (IGG), I E. AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 23 (1993).
449. Recent global nongovernmental efforts to combat corruption have led to the establish-
ment of Transparency International (TI), which is devoted to the compilation of an annual
international corruption index, and assisting in the establishment of local TI Chapters. See
Barbara Crossette, A Global Gauge of Greased Palms, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1995, at A3.
450. See SACHS, supra note 316.
451. See BArd-Anders Andreassen et al., Compliance with Economic and Social Rights:
Realistic Evaluations and Monitoring in the Light of Immediate Obligations, in Eide & Hagtvet,
supra note 416, at 260-61.
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To say that such action is necessary for human rights groups is to state
the obvious.452 What is really critical however, is to begin the process of
both encouraging a transformation in focus and a linkage to the broader
context of their operations. Such activity could be commenced through the
establishment of Country Committees on economic and social rights,453 and
a regional or sub-regional Coordinating Committee which would operate as
a clearinghouse for both information and strategies employed in different
parts of the region. A study on the impact of SAPs in a country like
Tanzania, which has had such a program for several years, would provide
significant support to activists working in a country just about to embark on
one. This would be of particular utility with respect to World Bank/IMF
programs on poverty-reduction and social welfare "nets," to cite just one
example. 4" This is especially important in the face of growing regional
initiatives in which governments are coordinating not only economic policy,
but also exchanging ideas on the control of opposition movements and the de-
stabilization of dissent.455
But SAPs are not only confined to Africa, they are truly global in ambit
and application. 56 African human rights groups need to develop strategies
of coordination and support with groups working in the Latin American and
Asian contexts, 47 as well as to begin a more active liaison with those in
452. The Status Report points to the significant expertise available among South African
human rights organizations, stressing that they
have enormous and perhaps incomparable expertise in pursuing issues of social and
economic deprivation from a rights perspective. The historical reason for this, clearly,
is the institutionalized racism which denied access to social and economic rights on
the basis of skin colour. It continues to be reflected in the large amount of time
which human rights organizations spend advising on issues such as pensions, labour
rights and housing.
Status Report, supra note 22, at 80.
453. See SACHS, supra note 316.
454. In this respect, the study on health in Zimbabwe for example, questioned the
"seriousness with which the World Bank has attempted to integrate poverty-reduction
mechanisms into structural adjustment. It also illustrates the grave dangers associated with the
imposition of ideologically motivated prescriptions for financing health systems." See OXFAM
REPORT, supra note 142, at 35.
455. Consequently, it is important to understand the regional underpinnings of practices like
"ethnic cleansing" and the support given to different oppressive regimes by their neighbors.
Although governments are loath to admit it, consultations at this level, or at a minimum, the
grafting and exchange of such strategies among African governments is widely practiced. See
Status Report, supra note 22, at 3.
456. The Bank and the IMF are fond of quoting the "phenomenal performance" of the so-
called Asian "tigers," ascribing to that success many of the policies now being applied in the
African context. It should not be forgotten however, that there are human rights problems (even
economic and social) in these countries too. See Suk Tae Lee, South Korea: Implementation and
Application of Human Rights Covenants, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 705, 720-23 (1993).
457. Groups such as the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) in the Philippines, and the
Law & Society Trust in Sri Lanka, are especially active in this field. See in particular, Ma.
Soccorro I. Diokno, Flag's Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Program (FLAG, Quezon City,
Philippines), 1993.
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Western capitals concerned with the ramification of development assistance
and its impact on human rights. Many of the methods employed in litigation,
advocacy and promotion can be borrowed from and usefully translated into
the African contexts, even from a country like the United States, despite
official apathy for this category of rights.458 Strategies such as suing arms
dealers for injury done by assault rifles, should at the very least be
considered for application in the international context.459 As conservatism
gains sway and lays waste to the welfare state, many more in the developed
countries will come round to the realization of the need to consider human
rights work in an integrated fashion. The experience of Social Action Litiga-
tion (SAL) in India dramatically radicalized human rights activism in that
country, and, prompted by a sympathetic Judiciary, provided an exemplar of
the use of law in the service of broadly-defined human freedoms. 4W Even
in the absence of an enabling constitutional framework which permits such
action, African activists can borrow the methods deployed by their Indian
compatriots in order to achieve a similarly revolutionary reconceptualization
of the notion of human rights.
The issue of the local operation of movements is, of course, critical to
the success of any strategy for the reinvigoration of economic and social
rights in Africa. Akwasi Aidoo brings together the most essential tenets of
a grassroots strategy for human rights groups that is simultaneously linked
in its focus and sustainable in its ambit:
[W]ork at the level of basic needs must itself be done with an eye to
human rights issues. In the end, development activities must be entry
points for enhancing human rights; specifically, human rights work must
incorporate development action. For example, working to protect and
defend the civil and political rights of refugees ought also to include
activities that would enhance their food security. Working with rural
dwellers to enhance their food security also ought to include addressing
issues such as land rights, security of tenure and their capacity to defend
their rights through existing legal means. Similarly, a project to improve
matemal health among the poor would also need to address questions of
reproductive health.
There is obviously a need to go beyond what Aidoo refers to as the
"commando" campaign approach to human rights work. 62 According to
458. See Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and International Human
Rights Law: Toward an 'Entirely New Strategy,' 44 HAST. L.J. 79 (1992); and Louis Henkin,
Economic Rights under the United States Constitution, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 97 (1994).
459. See Barry Meier, Guns Don't Kill, Gun Makers Do?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1995, at
E3. See also Addison v. Williams, 546 S.2d 220 (1989) (plea against gun manufacturer failed
in products liability).
460. For an interesting treatment of SAL, see BAXI, supra note 30, at 140-57.
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him the process of the grassroots defence of human rights must be executed
through promotional and empowering social action. 3 While this is true,
what is more important is to develop approaches that cover all fronts. We
should not therefore shift to "promotion and empowerment" without ensuring
that there are groups involved in advocacy, in litigation and with the other
tenets of "traditional" human rights work.' Work on economic and
social rights must be truly interdisciplinary, covering those involved with
development, humanitarian work and discrete political and social minorities.
In conclusion, the possibilities of undertaking collaborative work with
governments, in for example tackling the deleterious IMF/World Bank
policy-formulation, should not be ruled out ab initio. This is especially
relevant in contexts where governments lack the material resources to gather
information, or to take positive action. 5  Where such action assists in
meeting reporting and other obligations under the international framework,
or in making governments more responsive to them. Governments can
utilize the informational resources of human rights groups, for example, in
order to make the case for the cancellation of debt accrued over the years,
and for a less-rigid application of SAPs. Governments could utilize these
same resources for a more rigorous and concerted articulation of the
"noxious debts" defense, in a bid to make a case against the disproportionate
sharing of the burden/' It should be remembered that economic and
social rights are to be "progressively realized," 7 and the evolution of
strategies for their achievement may not necessarily map those of civil and
political rights. In sum, the approach to economic and social rights in Africa
requires a wholly novel approach, which must commence by building on
what is already in place, and designing appropriate structures and strategies
to face what lies ahead.
IV. A WORD IN CONCLUSION
This study can only be considered as the first tentative step in a long
journey yet to be made. It has principally sought to clarify the situation with
respect to the conceptual and practical issues involved in the struggle to
promote economic and social rights activism in Africa. Such an approach
was necessitated both by the rhetorical posture of the leadership on the issue,
as well as by the lack of critical intellectual treatment of the area. The
463. Id.
464. Connie de la Vega illustrates the various ways in which these rights can be promoted,
from bringing them to bear on judicial proceedings to employing them in administrative and
legislative advocacy. See Connie de la Vega, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
15 WHInTIER L. REv. 471, 474-87 (1994).
465. This point is made by Jhabvala, in discussing the socioeconomic context of human
rights violations. See Farrokh Jhabvala, On Human Rights and Socio-economic Context, in
Synder & Sathirathai, supra note 19, at 293-319.
466. See supra note 433.
467. ICESCR, supra note 2, art. 2.
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Article aimed solely to bring together previously unexplored dimensions of
the international, regional and national contexts in which economic and social
rights in Africa must necessarily be explored. The next stage must be an
articulation of appropriate strategies within specific domestic contexts, while
at the same time drawing upon international linkages of solidarity and
cooperation in order to place economic and social rights activism firmly on
the agenda of future human rights work.
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TABLE I
STATUS OF AFRICAN REPORTAGE UNDER THE ICESCR
(as of December 9, 1994) 48



















































































Arts. 6-9 and 13-15 overdue















Initial report due on 06/30/96
overdue
Pending consideration
Initial Report considered at 1994 session
Overdue
Initial report due on 06/30/95






Arts. 13-15 of initial report overdue
Overdue
Arts. 6-9 and 13-15 overdue
2nd Periodic report overdue
Arts. 6-9 and 13-15 overdue
Overdue
Source: Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on the Tenth and Eleventh
Sessions, (2-20 May, 1994; 21 November - 9 December, 1994); E/1995/22; E/C. 12/1994/20.
468. The reports of the Committee are issued annually, although the meetings of the
Committee are held twice a year. This means that the details of the last meeting of the
Committee in June, 1995, are not available at the time of publication of this Article. The status
of a number of the country-reports could have altered in the interim. South Africa signed the
Covenant in October, 1994, and will probably ratify the same fairly soon.
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